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Atheists are underrepresented in political office compared to their numbers in the general 
population.  In the United States, anti-atheist prejudice is prevalent, likely contributing to 
the disparity in atheist representation.  Informed by social identity theory and the 
sociofunctional approach to prejudice, the purpose of this study was to examine the 
comparative electability of atheists compared to other minority religious identities, as 
well as one nonminority option for a baseline reference of attitudes. Using the voter 
likelihood scale and three 7-point semantic differential scales, 579 participants rated their 
intention to vote for and their feelings of trust, disgust, and fear toward one of four 
political candidates representing different religious groups but who were otherwise the 
same candidate (Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist) presented to them 
randomly. Data were analyzed using four separate 2 X 4 factorial analyses of variance.  
Findings suggest that atheists are not viewed as unfavorably as Scientologists (groups 
perceived as cults), though atheists were viewed unfavorably on all measures of trust, 
disgust, and fear. Generating grassroots discourse about religious minority 
underrepresentation in elected office, as well as the prejudicial views many Americans 
hold toward minority religions, may build awareness and acceptance leading to positive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
 Atheists are underrepresented in political office despite the number of Americans 
identifying as atheists having more than doubled in the last few years (Ingraham, 2016; 
Lipka, 2016a).  A review of the literature suggests that widespread prejudice toward 
atheists is based on distrust and the belief that atheists are immoral (Edgell, Gerteis, & 
Hartmann, 2006; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 
2011).  However, despite this, little research has been done to examine atheist prejudice 
and discrimination specifically in the political sphere.  The stigma of atheists can be seen 
throughout U.S. culture; they are seen as a threat to the Christian values on which many 
Americans believe the country was founded (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 
2011).  As a result, there are no members of Congress who identify openly as atheists 
(Sandstrom, 2017).  With 91% of the current Congress identify as Christian, there are 
many minority religions left unrepresented or not represented proportional to their 
respective population representation (Sandstrom, 2017).  Viewed as outliers, non-
mainstream religious groups, such as Mormons and Scientologists, are marginalized 
(Doherty, 2014; Grieg, 2017; Harrison, 2015; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Penning, 
2009; Smith, 2014; Urban, 2012). 
This study demonstrates the comparative unelectability of atheists with other 
reviled and marginalized minority religious groups, including the emotional responses 
these candidates elicit.  Different emotions prompt different forms of prejudice, making it 
important to examine the ways prejudice toward atheists manifest (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
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2005).  While atheists remain underrepresented, issues important to them will likely 
continue to be ignored.  This includes protections for atheists against the many forms of 
discrimination they face, such as in child custody cases, the hiring process or in the 
workplace (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Volokh, 2006; Wallace et al., 2014). 
 This chapter will present the problem, purpose, and significance of the study.  The 
research questions and hypotheses will also be presented.  Further, the nature of the 
study, including the definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, and limitations 
will also be discussed. 
Background 
 Research examining anti-atheist prejudice has found the majority of Americans 
believe that atheists lack morality and are therefore capable of horrendous acts (Gervais, 
2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  This view makes it difficult for most people 
to trust atheists and is likely partially responsible for atheist underrepresentation in 
politics.  Only one study, to-date, has examined anti-atheist prejudice in the political 
realm, finding that compared to other historically marginalized groups (e.g., Black and 
gay men), atheists were the least likely to receive votes and engendered the strongest 
feelings of distrust, disgust, and fear responses from participants (Franks & Scherr, 
2014). 
 While public perception of atheists is overwhelmingly negative, evidence 
suggests that fringe religious groups that are viewed as “cultish” may be more reviled 
than atheists (Cragun, Henry, Homan, & Hammer 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson, 2006).  
However, these studies did not indicate specific religious designations, using only the 
3 
 
terms “new religious movement” and “cult” to gauge participant opinions, terms 
considered overwhelmingly negative (Cragun et al., 2012a; Olson, 2006).  While no 
person identifies as belonging to a “cult,” many outside observers believe they do 
(Cragun et al., 2012a; Olson, 2006).  This pejorative use of cult is commonly used toward 
Mormons and Scientologists, suggesting these individuals may have difficulty gaining 
acceptance and trust of the general public, particularly in politics (Greig, 2017; Harrison, 
2015).  For example, during the 2012 Presidential election, concerns over Mitt Romney’s 
religious affiliation dwarfed concerns for any other candidate, and voter aversion toward 
Mormons has increased following the election (Campbell, Green, & Monson, 2012; 
Smith, 2014; Smith, 2016).  During the campaign, a pastor introducing Rick Perry 
(another Republican candidate during the primary) referred to the Mormon Church as a 
cult (Oppel Jr & Eckholm, 2011).  This cult perception also extends to Scientology, with 
recent documentaries of those that have left the church painting the organization as 
sinister and secretive (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm, 2015).  A 
comparative study of fringe religious groups and atheists in politics had not yet been 
conducted (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Therefore, this quantitative study measured voting 
intention and the emotional responses of distrust, disgust, and fear toward candidates 
identifying as atheist, Mormon, Scientologist, and Protestant.    
Problem Statement 
Historically marginalized groups such as African Americans and ethnic minorities 
(15%), women (20%), and members of the LGBT community (1.5%) have seen great 
gains in political representation in the U.S. Congress (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  However, 
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individuals who self-identify as atheist are not making these strides; they represent only 
0.2% of Congress compared to 20% of the population (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  The 
115th Congress was assessed for religious affiliation, and the Pew Research Center found 
that the Congress was 91% Christian, well overrepresenting the U.S. Christian population 
(all Christian denominations combined comprise 70.6% of the population), whereas only 
a single member of Congress identifies as unaffiliated and no members identify as a 
nontraditional religion such as Scientology (Sandstrom, 2017).  Protestants, Catholics, 
and Jews are all overrepresented in Congress, while groups such as Muslims, Buddhists, 
and Mormons have equal representation in Congress proportional to the U.S. population 
(Sandstrom, 2017).  Despite the fact that atheists are one of the most rapidly growing 
minority groups and continually rank as one of the least accepted groups in the United 
States, anti-atheist prejudice in politics has been rarely examined (Doane & Elliot, 2015; 
Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Ingraham, 2016).  There are still states that 
require a religious oath for an individual to take political office, and despite the 
unconstitutionality of this, an atheist would first have to win elected office in one of these 
states to challenge the law.  Research indicates the odds are unlikely an atheist would be 
viewed positively enough to win office (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  This means that 20% of 
the population remain largely unrepresented in government and are often unable to seek 
or hold office as a result of both individual- and institutional discrimination (Franks & 
Scherr, 2014).   
Discrimination and prejudicial attitudes toward atheists have largely centered on 
the idea that they lack morality, making their trustworthiness suspect (Gervais, 2014; 
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Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011).  Recent research suggests that trust alone is not 
responsible for prejudice and discrimination against atheists.  A study comparing 
attitudes toward an atheist, African American, and gay male political candidate found that 
disgust (typically associated with antigay discrimination) and fear (typically associated 
with anti-Black male racism) were greatest toward the atheist candidate (Franks & 
Scherr, 2014).  While this study compared groups that are known to face discrimination, 
no study has yet compared atheist candidates to candidates of major (e.g., Protestant) and 
non-mainstream Christian (e.g., Mormon), or non-Christian (e.g., Scientology) religious 
groups within the United States (Cragun et al., 2012a; Franks & Scherr, 2014).  This 
study aims used the same attitude and emotion domains (i.e., distrust, disgust, and fear) to 
compare an atheist candidate to candidates from both mainstream and nontraditional 
religious backgrounds.  The view of mainstream religious groups served as a reference 
point in relation to both the atheist and fringe religious (e.g., non-mainstream Christian 
and non-Christian) identities and the emotional reactions these identities engender. 
Research has not yet determined if a difference exists between fringe groups with 
a Christian basis (e.g., Mormons) versus religious groups that have no inherently 
Christian foundation (e.g., Scientologists).  Scientology was selected for the non-
Christian religion as it is well-known, and often viewed as fanatical (Doherty, 2014; 
McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Urban, 2012).  Mormonism was selected for the fringe 
Christian religious identity as it is well known, is viewed as fanatical, and recent studies 
suggest Mormons face voter aversion (Penning, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014; 
Smith, 2014).  In addition, it was expected that voter preference for a candidate will 
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increase for those participants who share a religious ideology with the candidate as 
predicted by social identity theory; the greater the difference between the voter and 
candidate ideology, the less likely he or she is to vote for the candidate (Ben-Bassat & 
Dahan, 2012; Tajfel, 1970).  Add to that, the socio-functional approach to prejudice 
predicts that the greater the perception of threat based on religious values different from 
one’s own, the higher the levels of disgust, distrust, and fear as well as a decrease in voter 
intentionality (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  To-date, no research had examined the 
relationship between voter preferences and feelings of distrust, disgust, and fear toward 
political candidates or how atheist candidates will compare to Christian (e.g., Protestant), 
non-mainstream Christian (e.g., Mormon), and non-Christian (e.g., Scientologist) 
candidates in terms of voter intentions. Likewise, no studies had yet examined how 
similar religious ideologies shared by voter and candidate increases liking and voter 
preference for the candidate. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study assessed attitudes toward atheists and individuals who are members of 
traditional and nontraditional religions seeking public office.  Franks and Scherr (2014) 
suggested that it is unclear whether someone who identifies as a non-mainstream 
Christian (e.g., Mormon) or non-Christian (e.g., Scientologist) would face more or less 
discrimination than an atheist.  Fringe religious movements can be found both within 
Christian interpretations and outside (e.g., Mormonism is Christian, while Scientology is 
not).  As such, it will be important to compare not only the non-Christian fringe 
affiliations, but also the non-mainstream Christian group affiliations.  It is unclear if 
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fringe Christian denominations will be viewed more or less favorably than non-Christian 
denominations (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Lalich, 2009).  Comparing emotional responses 
(i.e., distrust, disgust, and fear) and political acceptance of atheists compared to 
mainstream and non-mainstream religious identities is the gap this study addressed. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking 
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-
mainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office 
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream 
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting 
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than 
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian 
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based 
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)? 
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Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory 
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
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Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and 
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear 
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the socio-





Social psychology studies have long examined prejudice through the lens of 
Social Identity Theory.  Social Identity Theory posits that personal identity is reflective 
of the social groups an individual belongs to, and as such, an individual’s group 
membership directly reflects his or her self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Tajfel (1970) studied minimal and arbitrary differences between group 
interactions, and found that an individual will allocate more resources to their own group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  Investment in one’s group increases a positive sense of self, 
especially when comparisons are made to other groups.  This results in ingroup and 
outgroup categories, where the outgroup is often a target of ingroup prejudice (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  However, research also suggests that simple ingroup and outgroup 
identities are not enough to explain the complexities of prejudice and discrimination.  
Studies that look at anti-atheist prejudice and discrimination typically frame the research 
within the socio-functional approach to prejudice, which suggests the affective as well as 
behavioral responses that a group elicits from others are a result of perceived threats from 
said group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2013).  These threats are different, based 
on the outgroup identity of the individual assessed (e.g., fear of Black men, disgust for 
gay men, distrust of atheists), and these different threats elicit different forms of prejudice 
and discrimination (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2013).  As this study focused on 
attitudes toward atheists and other minority identities as pertains to voter preferences, 
group identity and social identification are appropriate and important for this study.  By 
assessing emotional responses (e.g., disgust, distrust, and fear) and how these negative 
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emotions impact voter preference, the socio-functional approach complements Social 
Identity Theory’s assumption that a candidate’s religious similarity is likely to affect 
voter intention.  Understanding how negative emotions influence minority group 
favorability may help underrepresented groups gain political access.  
Nature of the Study 
This study utilized a quantitative between subjects 2 x 4 experimental design, 
with participant religious affiliation similarity (i.e., mainstream Christian, non-
mainstream Christian, non-Christian, and atheist) and candidate religious identities (i.e., 
mainstream Christian, non-mainstream Christian, non-Christian, and atheist) as the two 
independent variables and voter intention, disgust, distrust, and fear as the dependent 
variables.  As a result of the four levels of independent variables, it was necessary to 
conduct four separate factorial analyses of variance, for each candidate and participant 
religious affiliation interaction type.  Participants were asked to report the likelihood that 
they would vote for a candidate on a scale from 1 (no chance) to 9 (100% likely).  Four 
political candidates were presented randomly to participants and described as males, each 
belonging to a different religious group (Protestant, Scientologist, Mormon, and atheist).  
Any identity information that would alter the perception of the candidate (e.g., race, 
political party, sexual orientation) has been intentionally left out (e.g., candidate 
prioritizes health-care policy, with no emphasis on how he does so).   Furthermore, 
participants also rated the candidates on three 7-point semantic differential scales, 
assessing whether the candidate seemed (a) untrustworthy, (b) threatening or comforting, 
and (c) disgusting or appealing with 1 representing untrustworthiness, threatening, and 
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disgusting, and 7 representing trustworthiness, comfort, and appeal.  This emotional scale 
was constructed within the framework of the socio-functional approach to prejudice, 
which asserts that individuals ascribe positive emotional values to what he or she deems 
as an ingroup (e.g., nationality, religion, race) and negative emotional values to a 
threatening outgroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  The prejudicial response is 
distinctively different based on the emotion that elicited the prejudice be it the perceived 
threat to health, values, or physical safety (e.g., fear responses prompt the need to flee; 
Cottrell & Neurberg, 2005).  This design is similar to the design utilized by Franks and 
Scherr (2014) to examine atheist candidates compared to African American and gay male 
candidates; whereas, this study compared attitudes toward atheists and individuals who 
identify with nontraditional religions.   
Definition of Terms 
Religion: A system of faith involving hierarchal institutions with organized 
practices, beliefs, faith, and worship, typically centered on a belief in a superhuman 
controlling power such as a god or gods (Allport, 1950). 
Christianity: The organized religious institution based on the person and teachings 
of Jesus of Nazareth with structured beliefs and practices as defined by the Bible (Astley, 
1992). 
Christian: An individual who professes Christianity and its teachings and believes 
in Jesus Christ (Astley, 1992). 
Protestantism: The faith, practice, and churches that are forms of the Christian 
doctrine that are regarded as Protestant rather than Catholic or Eastern Orthodox; these 
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Western Christian churches follow the principles of the Reformation and include Baptist, 
Presbyterian, and Lutheran churches (Astley, 1992).    
Protestant: A member or follower of the Western Christian Protestant churches 
(Astley, 1992). 
Scientology: A religious system founded by L. Ron Hubbard in the 1950s 
requiring spiritual fulfillment be met through graded courses of study and training; 
Scientology is the belief that each human has a reactive mind that responds to life 
traumas, clouding the analytic mind and keeping humans from experiencing reality 
(Christensen, 2016; Urban, 2012).   
Scientologist: Adherents of the Church of Scientology doctrines and practices 
(Christensen, 2016; Urban, 2012). 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS): Founded in 1830 by 
Joseph Smith, a Christian restoration church that is considered by its members to be a 
restoration of the original church founded by Jesus Christ (Smith, 2016). 
Mormon: Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Smith, 
2016). 
Atheist: A person who lacks belief in the existence of a god or gods or disbelieves 
entirely (Gervais, 2013). 
Fringe Religion: Not part of the mainstream religious practices; an 
unconventional, peripheral, or extreme take on existing religious practices and groups 
(Olson, 2006).   
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Cult: A relatively small group of people having religious beliefs or practices 
regarded by others as strange or sinister; typically a system of religious veneration and 
devotion directed toward a particular figure or object (Richardson, 1993).   
Cult (As Pejorative): An insult used to demean smaller or more unusual religious 
practices that may not academically fit the definition of a cult, but are considered strange 
to the general public (Olson, 2006). 
Assumptions 
 There are aspects of this study that are believed to be true but cannot be 
demonstrated to be true, and therefore must be presented as assumptions to ensure the 
integrity of the study findings.  It is assumed that participants responded to the survey 
questions honestly.  While social desirability bias is always a possibility in self-report 
measures, anonymity and the ability to withdraw from the study at any time are 
preventive measures taken to minimize this and increase participant confidence.  
Furthermore, participants were also provided a statement of the importance of the study 
and its purpose, and the necessity of participants’ accurate and honest responses.  It is 
also assumed that participants whom elected to participate in this study can read English, 
are U.S. citizens, are of legal age, and of sound mind, and thus capable of navigating the 
study.  A consent page was presented prior to the participant beginning the study in order 
to minimize participants accessing the study who should not participate in the study.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that participants have some basic computer skills and 
understanding of navigating webpages.  The survey was designed in a simple and user-
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friendly format in order to minimize errors during the survey process as a result of 
computer application skills. 
Scope and Delimitations 
 The research questions address anti-atheist prejudice in a political setting and 
participants’ emotional reactions to atheist candidates.  This specific focus was chosen in 
order to expand upon the current literature and work towards alleviating atheist 
underrepresentation in political office.  The comparative electability of atheists with 
nontraditional religious candidates had yet to be examined (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Existing studies on anti-atheist prejudice and atheists in a political setting have 
documented negative attitudes and distrust toward atheists and a low likelihood of 
participants voting for atheist candidates compared to other historically discriminated 
against groups (e.g., Black men and gay men) who were still Christian (Franks & Scherr, 
2014; Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).   
This study was limited to respondents online who are U.S. citizens of legal voting 
age, capable of reading English, and find the survey through Survey Monkey advertising 
and hosting services and social media site (i.e., Reddit and Facebook).  However, while 
generalizability may be limited as a result of online hosting, demographic data was 
collected to ensure the variability of the sample. 
The Socio-functional Approach to Prejudice and Social Identity Theory have been 
selected as the most appropriate framework for the proposed study.  To date, nearly all 
anti-atheist prejudice research is grounded in these two theories; however studies 
examining the clinical ramifications for atheist identification (e.g., depression) have 
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examined atheist identity through the lens of concealable stigmatized identity theory and 
the consequences of belonging to a group that an individual may feel pressure to hide 
(Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012b; Doane & Elliot, 2015; Johnson, 
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).  Furthermore, some research 
examining cult perceptions utilized framing theory in order to examine how word and 
phrase changes altered perceptions of the same process for different groups (Pfeifer, 
1992).  While each offers important insight into atheist and group identity, both were 
beyond the scope of the proposed study.   
Limitations 
 One major limitation of this study is the nonrandom sampling method.  As the 
survey will be hosted online, this convenience sampling method can limit the 
generalizability of the study.  In addition to meeting the criteria for inclusion, this could 
limit the diversity of the sample as well as unintentionally exclude individuals from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds who may not have Internet access.  Another limitation of 
this study is the use of a between-groups design rather than a within-groups design.  
While it is not feasible to require participants to examine four separate candidates 
described identically except for religious identity, it does present a limitation as each 
respondent only viewed a single candidate option.   
Significance of the Study 
Although some studies have provided information about why individuals 
discriminate against atheists, very little research exists on prejudice toward atheists by 
voters (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  Expecting that 
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voters prefer candidates with similar religious ideologies, this study not only adds to the 
literature on (a) anti-atheist prejudice but on (b) the impact of shared religious identity on 
voter preference.  By advancing the literature on atheists and politics, perhaps gains can 
be made toward addressing their underrepresentation in elected office.  Gaining political 
representation would allow historically underrepresented groups to better combat 
institutionalized discrimination that affects their interests (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  For 
atheists this includes maintaining the separation of church and state and keeping politics 
more secularly inclusive rather than favoring Christianity.  Examples of this favoritism 
include laws passed or changed solely based on Christian values (e.g., Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, 573 U.S), states that prevent atheists from holding public office, and public office 
meetings beginning with Christian specific invocations, while excluding other religions 
or nonreligious individuals (American Civil Liberties Union, 2017; McElfresh, 2016; 
Mehta, 2016; Richer, 2017; Sager, 2014).  Furthermore, if atheists were able to gain 
access to public office, attention could be called to the common forms of discrimination 
atheists face on a daily basis to prevent hiring and workplace discrimination (Gervais, 
Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Wallace et al., 2014).  Atheist politicians could also hold 
judges accountable for custodial case discrimination of atheist parents versus Christian 
parents (Volokh, 2006).  Without equal representation, prejudicial and discriminatory 
practices against atheists largely stay under the radar and will continue to go unlegislated. 
Summary 
 This quantitative study examined the comparative electability of atheists to 
candidates of other nontraditional religious identities as well as the emotional responses 
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these candidates elicit.  Distrust of atheists and the belief that atheists lack morals have 
been well-documented, but only a single study has examined anti-atheist prejudice in a 
political setting (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 
2011).  This study expands on those findings, comparing atheists to nontraditional 
religious identities rather than historically marginalized groups such as Black men and 
gay men (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Voter intention and participant disgust, distrust, and 
fear toward the candidates were measured to determine the extent to which various 
religious identities are viewed negatively. 
 Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the literature, including seminal 
and contemporary research.  The gaps within the literature were examined and 
implications of the literature presented are discussed as is the theoretical foundation.  A 
literature review related to key variables is also provided.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Atheists in the United States are underrepresented in public office.  For example, 
in the 115th Congress only a single member of Congress identified as unaffiliated, and no 
members identified as openly atheist (Sandstrom, 2017).  In contrast, 91% identified as 
Christian, while the total United States population is only 70% Christian (Pew Research 
Center, 2014a; Sandstrom, 2017).  The population of individuals identifying as atheist in 
the United States has more than doubled in the last few years, with 3.1% of Americans 
identifying as atheist on the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, up from 1.6% in 2007 
(Ingraham, 2016; Lipka, 2016a).  This underrepresentation is difficult to overcome with 
pervasive negative perceptions of and prejudice toward atheists.  To demonstrate the 
unelectability of atheist political candidates, the aim for the study was to show (a) 
perceived atheist threat elicits negative emotional response and (b) atheists are more 
reviled than even the most historically reviled groups.  This may account for atheist 
underrepresentation in political office.    
Several studies have been conducted to examine anti-atheist prejudice, finding 
that atheists are distrusted, viewed as arrogant, immoral, associated with anti-American 
sentiments, and are most likely not to be accepted, both publicly and privately, when 
compared to almost any other ethnic and religious group studied (Edgell, Gerteis, & 
Hartmann, 2006; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 
2011).  The majority of Americans (77% of white evangelicals, 67% of Black Protestants, 
55% of Catholics, and 46% of white mainline Protestants) would be unhappy if an atheist 
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were to marry into the family (Lipka & Martinez, 2014).  Surveys suggest there is greater 
acceptance of individuals marrying across party lines, despite high levels of polarization 
in the current political environment, than there is of individuals who are religious 
marrying those who are not (Lipka & Martinez, 2014).   
This prejudice also extends to the political sphere; however, little research has 
been done to examine reasons for atheist underrepresentation in political office despite 
polls indicating that most Americans find atheist candidates less electable than candidates 
with traditional religious affiliations (e.g., Jewish, Catholic, Baptist; Jones, 2012; Pew 
Research Center, 2014a).  Examples of anti-atheist prejudice include comments made by 
political candidates about atheists as well as actions taken toward atheists in the public 
sphere.  In 2015, United States presidential candidate Ted Cruz remarked that atheists 
were not fit to be president, as a president must be willing to start his day with prayer and 
submit to the King, Jesus Christ (Wing, 2015).  Cecil Bothwell, an atheist elected to 
public office in Asheville, North Carolina, had to defend his election after opponents 
challenged the constitutionality of his holding political office, solely on the grounds of 
his atheism and because he took his oath of office on the Constitution instead of the Bible 
(Zucchino, 2009).  Despite federal laws making it illegal to require a religious test for 
public office, seven states still officially have laws on the books barring atheists from 
office (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Furthermore, in Arkansas a woman running for a seat on 
the board of education is the target of slander campaigns based solely on the fact she is an 
atheist and who opposed a local school that violated the First Amendment by inviting a 
Catholic nun to bless the school’s new fitness trail (Mehta, 2017).  Facebook founder 
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Mark Zuckerberg had previously listed his religious affiliation as atheist, but recently 
changed this stance to “believing religion is important,” with many analysts speculating a 
public office run in the near future, and open identification as an atheist is considered 
“political suicide” (Ohlheiser, 2017; Zauzmer, 2016). 
Policies that limit atheists’ access to public office or their right to live a secular 
lifestyle do not likewise apply to Christians.  This includes the seven states that currently 
ban atheists from holding public office, as well as the government demonstrating 
preferential treatment to Christianity and its symbols (Faircloth, 2012; Ferber, 2009; 
Ferber, 2012; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Stack, 2016; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2008).  For 
example, Christian icons and symbols are frequently found in public and government 
places, such as the use of the Bible to swear in on for court testimony, references to God 
on the currency and in the pledge, or nativity scenes and the monuments of the Ten 
Commandments placed in government buildings, while also denying other religious or 
secular displays until court intervention occurs (Getto & Harjai, 2015; Schwers, 2015).  
Furthermore, churches are granted tax exempt status, while also being granted tax 
funding for various projects (Goodstein, 2014; Moyer, 2017; Totenberg, 2017).  
Examples of Christian privilege in politics abound, including the use of public school 
funds for religious schools through vouchers, tax-breaks in the form of faith-based 
incentives, and legislation prioritizing Christian values (e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 
573 U.S.).  Atheist underrepresentation makes it difficult to maintain a secular 
government for all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation.   
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A study conducted in the South eastern United States to evaluate religious 
discrimination in the workplace, sent out 3,200 fictitious resumes to employers with each 
resume assigned one of seven religious affiliations: atheist, Catholic, evangelical 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, pagan, Wallonian (a fictitious religion created for the purpose 
of the study) and a control group with no mention of religious affiliation (Wallace, 
Wright, & Hyde, 2014).  Candidates who mentioned any religious affiliation received 
20% fewer phone calls and 33% fewer emails than the control group.  Researchers 
believed this may be because overt religious affiliations in the workplace may present 
conflict.  However, atheists faced considerable challenges from employers, with 49% 
fewer emails and 43% fewer phone calls than the control group and were ranked lower 
than the pagan or fictitious religion, as well as rating second to last on the employer 
preference scale, nearly matching the least preferred Muslims (Wallace et al., 2014). In 
addition to this form of hiring discrimination Gervais (Gervais et al., 2011) found that 
atheists face hiring discrimination in all high trust domain job roles, such as day care 
providers. 
While the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, many in the United States 
do not believe this includes freedom from religion.  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) often fights cases related to unjust treatment of atheists and the preferential 
treatment of Christians by the government.  Examples include (a) religious booths or 
decorations placed in government buildings while similar secular booths or decorations 
are rejected (e.g., Warren, Michigan City Hall);  (b) cases in which the government 
allows public funding to church groups (e.g., Trinity Lutheran v. Comer); (c) cases where 
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atheist school children have been removed from class or shamed for not saying God in 
the pledge (e.g., Acadiana High School; Lafayette, Louisiana); (d) as well as government 
sponsored Christian prayer in public assembly meetings, forcing the public to participate 
(e.g., Rowan County, North Carolina prayer practices; American Civil Liberties Union, 
2017; McElfresh, 2016; Mehta, 2016; Richer, 2017; Sager, 2014).   
Other examples of atheists denied equal protection under the law include child 
custody cases in which a parent participating in a church is granted custody over an 
atheist parent, because the judge rules that religion is for the greater good of the child 
(Stafford, 2010).  One case in New Mexico required a mother to attend religious 
counseling in order to gain custody of her children.  When she complained to the court 
about the religious overtones of the sessions, nothing was done, and she quit going.  
Being held in contempt of court, her children were removed from her care for four weeks, 
and she was forced to attend the sessions to regain custody of her children.  The mother’s 
sessions included handouts with Biblical scripture and homework assignments forcing the 
atheist to write “what is God to me” (Holland, 2015).  As punishment, this atheist mother 
was forced into Christian indoctrination to retain custody of her children.  Recently 
brought to national attention, the first bill offering protection to atheists was signed by 
President Obama in December of 2016 (Beres, 2017; Johnson, 2016; United States 
Congress, 2016).  This bill was amended and passed as a moral stance against the 
persecution of atheist writers and cartoonists, particularly in Middle Eastern countries.  
This bill also recognizes prejudice-based crimes, granting atheists and the nonreligious a 
protected class status (Beres, 2017; Johnson, 2016; United States Congress, 2016).  A 
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great deal of lobbying took place on the part of atheist activist groups to ensure their 
inclusion in this bill.  Greater political representation of atheists may alleviate some of 
the legal issues, namely their lack of protections, as it would give atheists some 
legislative power.  
As a result of pervasive negative perceptions of atheists, it is difficult for many of 
them to openly identify as atheist.  Many atheists remain “in the closet” to avoid the 
stigma, prejudice, and discrimination associated with atheist identification (Doane & 
Elliot, 2015; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012).  However, while open atheists do 
report experiencing prejudice and discrimination, individuals who choose to hide their 
identity report even greater levels of negative well-being as a result of this identity 
conflict (Cragun et al., 2012b; Doane & Elliot, 2015; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).  
Typically, minority groups that face prejudice from the majority (e.g., Blacks, gays, 
Muslims, etc.) face more intense and more prevalent prejudice as the group grows in size.  
For example, as Americans view larger numbers of Muslims coming to the United States, 
Muslim individuals face more prejudice that is more intense in nature, and larger 
numbers of Muslims per capita report experiencing prejudice (Gervais, 2011).  However, 
atheists are the opposite; research suggests people are more prejudiced toward atheists in 
part because they believe them to be such a small group relative to the general population 
(Gervais, 2011).  In recent years, the LGBT community has gained more mainstream 
public acceptance, while atheists have not (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Harms, 2011).  
Research suggests that greater exposure to atheists minimizes prejudice toward atheists, 
meaning more open atheist political candidates may also contribute to more atheists 
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feeling safe and comfortable in identifying themselves as such, possibly allowing atheists 
to gain acceptance the same way the LGBT community has been (Gervais, 2011; Harms, 
2011).  Because of this, atheist views and ideas are thought to be outliers.  However, 
when people perceive greater numbers of atheists around them, prejudice and implicit 
distrust toward atheists decreases suggesting that open atheist identification and greater 
representation in office may minimize anti-atheist prejudice (Gervais, 2011).  In order to 
address this problem, a greater understanding of the specific prejudice atheists face is 
needed to resolve their comparative unelectability.   
Current Literature and the Relevance of the Problem 
Though research on anti-atheist prejudice has increased over the last decade, it is 
still sparse.  The studies that have been done find that anti-atheist prejudice is associated 
mainly with distrust (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  Specifically, it 
is believed by many in the U.S. that morality derives from a higher power, and without 
answering to this higher power people lack morals (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; 
Gervais et al., 2011).  This interpretation of morality causes individuals to view it as a 
fixed value, where the Bible defines right and wrong in absolute terms.  As atheists do 
not have religious “rules” to adhere to, the atheist, therefore, cannot have morals, 
meaning nothing is stopping him or her from committing all manner of crimes (Gervais, 
2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  This leads to the conclusion that without 
morals, atheists are more likely to be criminals and engage in morally repugnant 
behavior, resulting in the inability to trust them (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et 
al., 2011).   
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These findings were expanded when a study by Franks and Scherr (2014) 
examined more than just distrust toward atheists but also disgust and fear, and found that 
atheist political candidates were viewed with more disgust and fear than were candidates 
belonging to groups that face discrimination typically associated with these emotions 
(e.g., Black males and gay males).  Furthermore, the likelihood participants would vote 
for the atheist candidate compared to a Black male candidate or the gay male candidate 
was measured, and participants were less likely to vote for the atheist candidate when 
compared to these candidates representing groups that are historically discriminated 
against (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  However, the focus of the Franks and Scherr (2014) 
study was on comparing atheists to either the majority religious group (e.g., Christians) or 
historically marginalized groups (e.g., Black males and gay males).  Only one study has 
compared atheists and the nontraditionally religious (e.g., cultists, with no real-world 
religious label) in any fashion (e.g., Cragun et al., 2012a), and no study has compared 
these groups in a political setting. 
Research suggests that the only social or religious groups that may be more 
reviled than atheists are cults (Cragun et al., 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson, 2006).  As such, 
the use of cult groups may serve as a useful metric for determining the extent to which 
the general public dislikes atheists.  The aforementioned study did not compare atheists 
and cultists in a political setting, and furthermore did not use any specific religious label 
to compare atheists to cultists (Cragun et al., 2012a).  Instead the study assessed atheists 
versus “cultists,” using the cultist label specifically.  Research has not yet determined the 
comparative electability of atheists with religions historically at odds with mainstream 
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values (e.g., Mormons and Scientologists both viewed as fanatical).  Determining 
whether atheists engender feelings of fear, distrust, and disgust and are more or less 
electable than historically unelectable political candidates (i.e., Mormons and 
Scientologists) is important in terms of the potential for atheist representation in political 
office (Doherty, 2014; Grieg, 2017; Harrison, 2015; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; 
Penning, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014a; Smith, 2014; Urban, 2012). 
Preview of Major Sections of the Chapter 
This chapter outlines the literature to-date regarding anti-atheist prejudice as well 
as the literature assessing the consequences of such prejudice for the atheist population, 
especially insofar as political underrepresentation is concerned.  Social Identity Theory 
and the socio-functional approach to prejudice will be discussed, including not only the 
types of research that have been done within each framework, but also the relevance of 
each theory to the proposed study.  The literature related to the key variables are 
reviewed, including studies that have identified the range of negative emotions 
underlying anti-atheist prejudice and the implications for atheists seeking political office 
is discussed.  Nontraditional religious affiliations, cult identity, atheist identity, and how 
the public perceive these groups are discussed.  The gaps within the literature are 
identified as is the significance of the proposed study.  
Literature Search Strategy 
Conducting an extensive review of the literature to assess key areas for future 
research and gain an understanding of the problem was necessary and possible through 
the use of the Walden University Library and Google Scholar.  Databases used during 
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this review include: Academic Search Complete, Annual Reviews, LexisNexis 
Academic, ProQuest Central, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, SAGE Premier, 
ScienceDirect, SocINDEX, and Taylor & Francis.  Books containing pertinent 
information about research methods and theory were purchased and reviewed, and 
articles referenced within the books were investigated.  The American Psychological 
Association database PsycNET was also utilized.  Data on political representation and 
religious populations within the United States were obtained from Pew Research Center’s 
Religious Landscape Study and was especially helpful in establishing empirical support 
for the relevance of this study. 
Search terms included the following: religious discrimination, anti-atheist 
prejudice, discrimination, prejudice, socio-functional approach, social identity, cults, cult 
perceptions, religious identity, atheism, intergroup prejudice, intergroup dynamics, 
intergroup threats, intergroup emotions, voter attitudes, stereotyping, values threat, 
threat perceptions, religiosity, fringe religious groups, fringe Christian groups, 
Scientology, perceptions of Mormons, Mormonism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Muslims, 
government, emotional reactions, emotional responses, religious denominations, 
attitudes, morality, political discrimination, and factorial research design. 
The literature dealing with prejudicial attitudes is extensive, including the seminal 
work on Social Identity Theory and the socio-functional approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  In addition to articles on theoretical 
approaches to prejudice, an investigation of attitudes toward religious and nonreligious 
individuals was conducted.  The empirical work of preeminent authors on anti-atheist 
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prejudice includes research from Will Gervais (2011, 2013, 2014), Ritter and Preston 
(2011), and Cook, Cottrell, and Webster (2015).  Research on other forms of religious 
prejudice and discrimination in order to establish context as well as the prevalence of the 
problem is also discussed (e.g., Dunkel & Dutton, 2016; Johnson, Rowatt, & Labouff, 
2010; Mikołajczak, & Pietrzak, 2014).  Research utilizing the socio-functional approach 
to prejudice to compare atheist political candidates to historically marginalized groups is 
also discussed (Franks & Scherr, 2014), as well as pertinent information regarding the 
perceptions of Americans to cult and fringe religious groups (Cragun et al., 2012a; 
Urban, 2012; Olson, 2006). 
Theoretical Foundation 
The Socio-functional Approach to Prejudice 
Despite numerous types of stereotypes that prompt prejudice and discrimination, 
traditional theories and approaches to prejudice only analyze negative feelings as an 
aggregate and their intensity exhibited toward a group and its members (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2011).  However, until recently, researchers have not focused on 
the range of emotions, both positive and negative, associated with prejudice (e.g., anger, 
fear, disgust, pity, admiration, guilt, etc.).  This diversity of emotion was first noted by 
Allport (1954).  While Katz (1960) suggested attitudes serve a specific function (e.g., 
adjustment, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge functions), as well as 
discussing attitude arousal on the basis of threats (e.g., ego-defensive attitudes are 
aroused by threats, appeals to hatred, repressed impulses, and authoritarian suggestions), 
the theory was never used in the context of specific emotions for specific types of 
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stereotyping or prejudice.  As such, the emotional range associated with prejudice was 
not examined and conceptualized into a workable theory until Cottrell and Neuberg 
(2005) established the socio-functional approach to prejudice studies.  The assumption 
was that if individuals have distinct beliefs regarding different groups, the distinct 
feelings associated with those beliefs may provide greater context and understanding of 
prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
The socio-functional approach to prejudice posits that researchers must first 
understand the unique threats posed before understanding the prejudice against that group 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  Prejudice is typically linked to the perception of a threat, 
and each threat perception correlates to a specific emotional response.  Perceived threats 
to security and safety elicit the emotional response of fear, whereas threats to physical 
(e.g., food poisoning) or moral contamination (e.g., sexual liberation versus abstinence 
before marriage) elicit the emotional response of disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  
These visceral emotions each present differently (e.g., facial expressions, neurological 
processes, and physiologic patterns) and as such has distinct correlated behavior (Cottrell 
& Neuberg, 2005).  Examining these emotions, researchers have found that priming 
individuals with the emotion relative to a specific group (e.g., disgust toward gays, anger 
toward Arabs) increased implicit bias toward those groups (Dasgupta, DeSteno, 
Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009).  Studies utilizing the socio-functional approach to 
prejudice have typically associated a single perceived threat and correlated emotional 
response to a group facing prejudice (see: Cook, Li, Newell, Cottrell, & Neel, 2016; 
Levin et al., 2016; Levin, Kteily, Pratto, Sidanius, & Matthews, 2013).  The proposed 
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study hypothesizes that participants will exhibit greater levels of disgust, distrust, and 
fear toward atheist political candidates than toward other nontraditional religious groups 
that are typically considered at odds with mainstream American values (e.g., 
Scientologists and Mormons).  As a result of these negative emotions and the associated 
threats many believe atheists pose, the electability of atheists is called into question, 
resulting in political underrepresentation of atheists at local, state, and federal levels of 
government. 
A series of experiments conducted by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) to assess how 
specific threat perceptions (real or imagined threats to safety, values, etc.) about a group 
(e.g., Blacks, Muslims, gays, etc.) in relation to the stereotypes typically associated with 
the group (e.g., unintelligent, lazy, poor, criminal, etc.) would cause the individual to feel.  
The study noted that fear toward Black men, as a result of media images that often prime 
criminality, was associated with a perceived threat to safety.  This means that the type of 
threat perceived (e.g., fear) by the majority ingroup (e.g., Whites) from the minority 
outgroup (e.g., Blacks) engenders a prejudicial response reflected by the subsequent 
behavior (e.g., fear responses elicit the tendency to flee).  An emotional response to a 
group perceived to be a moral threat (e.g., disgust), might prompt the expulsion of the 
contaminated idea or object (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  While activist feminists, 
African Americans, and fundamentalist Christians were all viewed as threats in the 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) study, the type of threat each group posed was different, and 
the extent to which each group faced prejudice, the types of emotions, and types of 
stereotypes related to each group were significantly different (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  
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The specificity of emotions related to threat perceptions and prejudice allows for precise 
examination of prejudice in the context of a given group, while traditional measures of 
prejudice are too general and ignore how prejudice is activated.  By examining threat to 
emotion activations by prejudice, a greater understanding of the degree to which atheists 
are viewed negatively can be achieved.  Furthermore, this understanding may contribute 
to ameliorating the problem of atheist unelectability.   
It was expected that this study would also have similar findings to Cottrell and 
Neuberg (2005), where group affiliation elicits different emotional reactions and levels of 
intensity among participants.  For example, studies examining perceptions of Muslims 
find people are typically angry toward Muslims and fearful of them, and these emotions 
are related to threats to personal security (fear) and personal resources (anger).  Atheists 
on the other hand are viewed as a moral contaminant, therefore disgusting and cannot be 
trusted (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Matthews & Levin, 2012).  
It is currently unclear how Scientologists and Mormons will be perceived.   
Utilizing the socio-functional approach to prejudice, distrust has been found to be 
a core feature of anti-atheist bias (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2007; Gervais, Shariff, & 
Norenzayan, 2011).  Research suggests atheists are distrusted in part because they do not 
adhere to a structured religious practice or dogma and, consequently, perceived to lack 
cooperation and morality which undermines the social order (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011) found that participants who reported distrusting 
atheists not only believe in God but also believe that God is watching their behavior, 
resulting not only in the participant feeling mindful of their actions, but also believing 
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atheists are not mindful of their actions because they lack this belief (Gervais et al., 
2011).  While belief in God correlated with greater levels of distrust of atheists, liberal 
and secular groups in the U.S. were also found to distrust atheists (Gervais et al., 2011).  
Findings show atheists were socially excluded from high-trust domains (e.g., daycare 
worker) while a description of a criminally untrustworthy individual (e.g., damaging 
property, stealing) was assumed to be either an atheist or a rapist but not a Christian, 
Muslim, Jew, feminist, or homosexual (Gervais et al., 2011).   
The study was limited to the U.S., which is predominately Christian.  A recent 
study looked at global distrust by examining 13 countries including majority-Buddhist, 
Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and nonreligious countries.  The experiment utilized the 
conjunction fallacy, where participants are asked which group is more likely to commit a 
specific act, and even in highly secular countries (e.g., Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
Finland, China), participants intuitively judged atheists less trustworthy and more likely 
to commit immoral acts (Gervais et al., 2017).  Even atheists tend to judge other atheists 
as distrustful, suggesting that anti-atheist prejudice is globally widespread (Gervais et al., 
2017).  These findings suggest that people perceive religion and belief in a god as 
necessary for morality, trust, and prosociality to exist in individuals (Gervais et al., 2017; 
Neuberg et al., 2014).     
Franks and Scherr (2014) utilized the socio-functional approach and the previous 
research relating distrust to atheist prejudice in order to not only examine anti-atheist 
prejudice in a political setting but also to examine other emotions related to different 
types of prejudice.  Specifically, Franks and Scherr (2014) sought to examine the two 
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emotions most commonly connected to bias and prejudice toward two of the most 
historically discriminated against groups in the United States, Black men and gay men.  
Fear is predominately responsible for prejudice toward Black men, particularly as a result 
of media priming that presents Black men as criminal, and disgust largely governs the 
prejudice toward gay men, as it is considered a threat to values and morals.  Each of these 
emotions, connected to prejudice within the framework, stems from unique threats these 
groups are perceived to pose to the White, heterosexual, Christian majority in the US 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012).  Appraisals of threats are linked to 
specific emotions, e.g., a threat to physical safety would elicit fear, a threat to personal 
rights and freedoms would elicit anger, and a threat to group value and morality would 
elicit feelings of disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  The study found that not only were 
atheist candidates more distrusted (as was predicted based on prior findings) than Black 
male and gay male candidates, but atheists were also considered more disgusting and 
participants were more afraid of the atheist candidate as well (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
To contrast the high levels of distrust associated with atheists, many political candidates 
emphasize their traditional religious values, which may be an attempt to enhance public 
perception of the candidate’s morality and elicit trust (Clifford & Gaskins, 2016).  
Utilizing the socio-functional approach in a political setting allows researchers to get a 
glimpse into the emotional prejudices that influence voter preference.   
Following the Franks and Scherr (2014) study that established atheists in a 
political setting were targets of more than a single negative prejudicial emotion, Cook, 
Cottrell, and Webster (2015) found atheists were perceived as a greater threat to values 
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and elicited a stronger reaction of moral disgust than other groups such as gay men and 
Muslims.  Primed with stories of moral decline, the experimental group was presented 
with a narrative of current college students not valuing traditional values such as loyalty 
and fidelity as well as greater instances of students lying and cheating than in past years 
(Cook et al., 2015).  The individuals primed with threat-to-values stories showed an 
increase in prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory intentions toward atheists (Cook et al., 
2015).  This finding is in line with previous research finding that high levels of distrust 
toward atheists relates to the belief that atheists lack cooperation and undermine the 
social order (Cook et al., 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  Examining 
the comparative electability of atheists and nontraditional religious candidates provided 
new data for each group, specifically in a political setting, and may provide insight into 
improving the electability of atheists by understanding the context of the prejudice 
atheists face and to what extent the prejudice is exhibited relative to other reviled 
religious groups. 
Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests people identify themselves in relation to the 
groups they belong to (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  This means 
that an individual’s family and relationships, vocation and hobbies, religious and political 
affiliations, social and economic class, gender, and race are all groups that define the 
person’s self-identity.  Which identity is most accessible to an individual will vary based 
on the specific situation he or she is in (Yakushko, Davidson, & Williams, 2009).  For 
example, religious icons displayed publically may remind an individual of his or her 
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religious identity while the national anthem is a reminder of national identity.  This can 
also occur and even be heightened when an individual’s identity is threatened by conflict 
with another group (e.g., gender roles, racial identity, role of authority, religious 
identities, etc.).  Threats to individual identity can become especially volatile when 
threatened or disrespected (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  For example, in the United States, 
the majority of individuals (70%) belong to some form of Christian church (Pew 
Research Center, 2014).  If an atheist is open about his or her identity, a perceived threat 
may be experienced by both the Christian and the atheist, as each will perceive 
challenges to their self-identity, pride, and self-esteem (Cowgill, Rios, & Simpson, 2017; 
Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  As individuals tend to view 
themselves in a positive light, they also tend to view the groups they belong to in an 
equally positive light (Cialdini et al., 1976; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980).  Individuals 
may view themselves positively based on the accomplishments of their group (even if 
they did not contribute directly to these accomplishments).  They may also attempt to 
enhance the status of their group through involvement in it, such as proselytizing a 
specific religious faith (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).   
Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed that individuals evaluate others utilizing three 
mental processes: (1) categorization (i.e., individuals categorize people and objects to 
organize the social environment), (2) social identification (i.e., individuals adopt the 
identity of the group to which they belong), and (3) social comparison (i.e., individuals 
compare their groups to others).  Categorization is a natural mental process that allows 
the person to quickly understand the world around them by evaluating people based on 
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their group identities (e.g., a man versus a woman).  This enhances the individual’s sense 
of safety as the person associates a specific group (e.g., police) with a specific trait (e.g., 
safety).  However, as categorization exaggerates differences between groups and 
minimizes differences within groups (e.g., people often see the outgroup as more 
homogenous than the ingroup, making it easy to assert “they are all alike”), this presents 
the danger of stereotyping and prejudice (Tajfel, 1981).  Viewing a group as monolithic 
(e.g., atheists all lack morals) makes it likely all individuals in that group are judged the 
same regardless of individual differences.  Once stereotypes become established as a 
cognitive representation of a group, it is difficult to alter these perceptions.  These 
perceptions influence individual judgments and thereby influence beliefs and emotions 
that lead to prejudicial views.  The expectation prior to data collection was that 
underlying stereotypes and prejudicial feelings may disincline participants to vote for that 
candidate.  Specifically, it was expected participants will be more likely to vote for 
candidates with similar versus dissimilar identities.   
Social identity, while able to promote self-esteem, prosociality, and societal 
cooperation, also produces religious and political tribalism, meaning that individuals will 
rigidly defend and support their group simply because they belong to it (Simpson, 2006).  
For example, the Democratic Party platform presents many issues that, for many 
Democrats, are not necessarily ideologically consistent.  An individual’s stance on trade 
does not decide his or her stance on immigration or abortion.  However, despite members 
potentially disagreeing with specifics of the platform, and having little in common with 
other members, individuals will coalesce around their party’s platform which they view 
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as far superior to the Republican Party platform (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina & 
Abrams, 2008; Ornstein, 2014).   
As groups may compete with one another for status (e.g., the winning political 
party of a presidential election) or resources (e.g., the number of people belonging to a 
church in a single community), prejudice can arise that fuels polarization (i.e., division 
into sharply contrasting groups with opposing ideologies) and eventually tribalism 
(Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005).  While tribalism (i.e., behavior and attitudes 
that stem from strong loyalty to one's own social group or “tribe”) benefits the ingroup, it 
can also mean that group members (a) fail to question their group’s doctrine when 
warranted and (b) staunchly oppose their group’s foes even when not warranted.  
Tribalism is prominent in the current political environment, with Democrats and 
Republicans supporting their respective party at all costs, regardless of legislative beliefs 
or gains (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Ornstein, 2014). 
This tribalism of the current environment also extends to religious identification, 
as the Republican Party is strongly linked to and identifies as evangelical Christian 
(Lipka, 2016b).  One need only examine media coverage from conservative news outlets 
during Democratic President Obama’s administration to see how often he was painted as 
“other,” by suggesting he was a Kenya-born Muslim (Gore, 2017).  One-third of 
conservatives and 17% of Americans believed Barack Obama to be a Muslim, while 
many conservatives also believed he was an anti-American immigrant from Africa (Gore, 
2017).  This type of tribalism was examined in a study assessing participant reactions to 
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various target subject identities, based on which identity had been made more salient at 
the time (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012).   
Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2012) presented female Muslim subjects for Western 
female participants to examine, with the predominate social identity varying for each 
subject (e.g., Muslim woman, student, young adult).  In groups where the subject was 
presented as a Muslim woman, female participants felt greater levels of disgust, fear, and 
anger.  However, when the same subject (Muslim woman) was presented as a student or 
young adult, with no emphasis on her religious identity, these emotions were not nearly 
as frequent or as strong (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012).  It is believed the reason for the 
reaction is that the combined identity of Muslim woman elicits a threat reaction in 
Western women related to the fear of physical harm (because of Islamic terrorism), 
threats to personal rights and freedoms (e.g., Sharia law in majority Muslim countries), 
and threats to group values and morality (e.g., religious and ideological differences 
related to women’s rights).  The study provided evidence of how identity salience affects 
the emotional response of participant observers when the acknowledged identity of a 
target subject threatens a social identity of the participant (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012).  This could have political implications for atheists, if atheist 
candidates can understate the atheist identity and instead foreground political party or 
national identity that resonates with the majority of voters. 
According to Seul (1999) religious group conflict is well-explained through the 
use of Social Identity Theory for many reasons.  First, a great deal more of an 
individual’s psychological needs and cultural meaning are met by their religious group 
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affiliation (e.g., cosmology, moral frameworks, institutional organization, rituals, 
traditions, etc.).  With much of an individual’s identity tied to religious group affiliation, 
it stands to reason that intergroup conflict would be common across religious groups, 
even in cases of seemingly arbitrary and minimal differences (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & 
Anisman, 2010).  This concept was further validated in a global analysis of cultural and 
religious intergroup conflict.  The analysis, including 194 religious and ethnic groups 
around the world from 97 sites, found that in places where religion is highly infused in 
group life (e.g., Pakistan), groups were significantly more prejudiced against opposing 
groups with incompatible values (e.g., Christians and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan), which 
led to greater discrimination (Neuberg et al., 2014).  The study found, further, that when a 
disadvantaged group had lower levels of religious infusion (secularists in Argentina), the 
group typically avoided direct, aggressive conflict against the more resource-rich and 
powerful counterparts (Christians in Argentina), whereas disadvantaged groups with high 
levels of religious infusion sought out direct and aggressive conflicts (Palestinians versus 
Israelis), even in the face of significant tangible costs (Neuberg et al., 2014).   
Further, religious infusion was also a significant predictor of all forms of conflict 
including prejudice, interpersonal discrimination, individual and collective violence, and 
demonstrated increases in symbolic aggression (Neuberg et al., 2014).  Not only does this 
demonstrate the importance of social identity, it may explain why atheists in the United 
States are less aggressive toward Christians versus the aggressive nature of 
fundamentalist Christians toward religious minorities and secular ideas (e.g., the “war on 
Christmas”; Ferber, 2012).  Lacking political representation, atheists lack the resources to 
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challenge large, wealthy, and politically powerful Christian groups.  Another study 
suggests any culturally diverse organizations (e.g., religious groups that are shaped by 
ideology and not necessarily ethnicity) are likely to experience conflict between the 
minority and majority identities within the group as a result of the “us” versus “them” 
social categorization practice (e.g., White and Black people belonging to the same 
Christian denomination; Hofhuis, van der Zee, & Otten, 2012).  This may offer insight 
into why similar but different Christian groups experience conflict among themselves; 
while they are similar in religion, interpretational differences create group differences 
across denominations.  
Studies informed by Social Identity Theory require two opposing groups who 
challenge each other’s core motives of belonging and self-enhancement (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986).  However, these studies examine social identity differences between groups 
without examining threats or emotions that underlie prejudice.  The theory complements 
other theories that may be more capable of explaining a specific threat or emotion related 
to ingroup/outgroup threats and prejudice (Haselton & Buss, 2003).  For this reason, 
Social Identity Theory was revised over time, generating new theories.  For example, 
social identity threat theory emerged to assess how ingroups perceive outgroup threats as 
well as how minorities, that frequently feel threatened, manage this situation (Alexander, 
1974; Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, & 
Cohen, 2012).  As this theory branched into smaller subsets, one focused on the array of 
emotions individuals experience related to prejudice and focusing specifically on which 
threats prompted which emotions.  This allowed for a look at the (a) interaction between 
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outgroup threat and their emotional reactions and (b) subsequent behaviors associated 
with each (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  To understand how group identities and emotional 
threat perceptions interact, the proposed study will be informed by both Social Identity 
Theory and the socio-functional approach to intergroup prejudice. 
Rationale for SIT and Socio-functional Approach in Proposed Study 
Frameworks that have been produced as a result of SIT, including the socio-
functional approach, are extensive and each assesses a small aspect of the complex 
attitudes and the underlying mechanisms involved in intergroup relations (e.g., Feather & 
McKee, 2012; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Whitley, 1999).  This study compared 
emotions elicited by prejudice toward atheists and nontraditional religious groups in a 
political context, and the socio-functional approach facilitated this assessment.  SIT will 
predict participants’ voting intentions relative to their own social identities.  The socio-
functional approach has been used in other studies to assess the unique prejudice, and its 
underlying emotions, exhibited toward atheists.  Because atheists do not represent a 
cohesive group, with no unifying doctrine, ethnicity or nationality, and no ideological 
agreement outside of expressing disbelief in a deity, utilizing this approach to understand 
the emotions associated with prejudice and discrimination toward atheists is necessary to 
explain the gross underrepresentation of atheists in elected office.  
However, many fringe groups are isolated from other groups and therefore unified 
in their ideology and goals across members (e.g., Mormons and Scientologists; Doherty, 
2014; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Urban, 2012).  SIT has been particularly successful 
at providing powerful explanations for ingroup bias and outgroup stereotyping (Brown, 
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2000).  However, SIT could become more predictive by incorporating affect into the 
theory (Brown, 2000).  For that reason, using the socio-functional approach in relation to 
SIT is useful.  With this in mind, examining groups through the lens of SIT and the 
sociofuntional approach may explain the unelectability of atheist political candidates as 
well as predict participants’ ingroup voting favoritism.  Furthermore, while SIT asserts 
that participants will likely prefer candidates similar to themselves, the sociofuntional 
approach allows for an examination of the emotions associated with the types of 
perceived threats from dissimilar candidates.  Both theories serve to explain the prejudice 
underlying the historical unelectability of atheist candidates seeking political office.  
Literature Review Related to Key Variables 
Key variables related to this study include (a) religious discrimination, with a 
focus on atheists as well as nontraditional religious identities (b) ingroup/outgroup 
prejudice and discrimination as a function of social identity (c) voting behavior as a 
function of ingroup/outgroup prejudice and discrimination, and (d) the emotional 
responses associated with ingroup/outgroup prejudice and discrimination.  Literature 
related to these variables as well as the methodology of this study were reviewed and 
synthesized in order to identify areas for future research and understand the background 
of the problem in its entirety.  The predominance of Christian political representation has 
resulted in the lack of representation in both nontraditional religious and nonreligious 
individuals.  This minimizes these groups ability to effectively fight for issues important 
to them, while increasing the ability of Christians to do so.  The purpose of this study is 
to gain greater understanding of the prejudice that makes it difficult for nonreligious 
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political candidates to both run and win elected office, as well as political candidates 
from less traditional religious groups.   
Religious Discrimination 
Within social psychological study, researchers have attempted to understand the 
complex mechanisms of religion (e.g., Allport, 1950; Allport, 1966; Brown, 1964; Hall, 
Matz, & Wood, 2010; Herek, 1987).  One of the most fascinating discoveries regarding 
religious study is the relationship between religiosity and prejudice/discrimination.  
Gordon Allport (as cited in Allport & Ross, 1967) described religious individuals as 
possessing either intrinsic or extrinsic orientation toward religion, which motivated 
prejudice and discrimination.  An extrinsic religious orientation means the individual has 
personal motives that lie outside of religion (e.g., social acceptance) and is, therefore, 
using religion for some nonreligious ends (e.g., social advancement; Allport, 1950).  An 
intrinsic religious orientation means the individual believes in living by the letter of the 
religious doctrine; the motives to be religious lie within the individual (Allport, 1950).  
Allport and Ross (1967) found that churchgoers were more prejudiced than non-
churchgoers, and that within the churchgoer group, people described as indiscriminately 
pro-religious were the most prejudiced of all.  Focused on ethnic discrimination, Allport 
and Ross noted that individuals with an extrinsic religious orientation were significantly 
more prejudiced than those with an intrinsic religious orientation.  However, subsequent 
studies that have utilized the religious orientation approach find that individuals with an 
intrinsic orientation are also prejudiced, but their target of prejudice is instead the LGBT 
community (Herek, 1987).  This presented new evidence that religion itself could not 
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only provide justification for prejudice, but engender it as a result of its teachings.  That 
is because the LGBT community is viewed as a moral threat to Christian religious 
teachings, as it is viewed as a sin.  This corresponds to research findings utilizing the 
socio-functional approach to prejudice that suggest members of the LGBT community 
are viewed as a moral threat and therefore people are disgusted by them (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Religion has historically been difficult to operationally define, and as such 
different researchers have approached the topic of religion through different lenses.  
Allport (1962) stated that religious prejudice be considered in the context of the personal 
(e.g., personality factors of the individual) and society (e.g., social groups, authority 
figures, and hierarchical structures).  Some research focuses on the organizational 
structure of religion (e.g., the institution of religion) and its subsequent effects (e.g., 
Heichel, Knill, & Schmitt, 2013; Sommer, Bloom, & Arikan, 2013; Swan, Heesacker, 
Snipes, & Perrin, 2014).  For example, highly religious nations were found not to be less 
corrupt than nonreligious nations, and instead democracy seemed to be a necessary 
element of a religious nation to curtail corruption (Sommer, Bloom, & Arikan, 2013).  
Other researchers focus on the benefits or consequences to the individual as a result of 
the practice or adherence to religion as well as differences between spiritual and religious 
belief concepts and how these vary from the ritualistic practice of religion (e.g., Ivtzan, 
Chan, Gardner, & Prashar, 2013; Lutjen, Silton, & Flannelly, 2012; Wilson, Bulbulia, & 
Sibley, 2014).  Some studies compare the differences between religion as a practice and 
institution with god concepts (e.g., morality and prosociality) to determine how each 
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affects people differently (e.g., Preston & Ritter, 2013; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; 
Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2015).   
Research often distinguishes between spirituality and religion, claiming that 
religion is a practice while spirituality is a belief.  An individual may not necessarily 
practice specific behaviors or adhere to a given institution as a result of his or her belief 
(e.g., Emmons, 1999; Pargament, 1999; Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott, 1999).  
Pargament (1999) believed that while religion is defined as institutional, organizational, 
ritualistic, and ideological, spirituality is defined as personal, affective, experiential, and 
thoughtful.  Because Social Identity Theory deals with an individual’s identity in relation 
to his or her social groups, the proposed study will focus on the institution and practice of 
religion.  
Both prejudice and discrimination in relation to religion come in many forms.  
Studies have been conducted to demonstrate the role of religion in discriminating against 
ethnicities and races (e.g., Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), 
sexual orientation (e.g., Cunningham & Melton, 2013; Whitley, 2009; Woodford, Levy, 
& Walls, 2013), as well as gender (e.g., Burn & Busso, 2005; Maltby, Hall, Anderson, & 
Edwards, 2010; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014; Taşdemir & Sakall-Uğurlu, 2010).  
Studies also show country-specific majority religions (e.g., Christianity in the U.S.) 
discriminate against minority religions (e.g., Muslim immigrants) in that same country 
(e.g., Jasperse, Ward, & Jose, 2012; Taras, 2013; Wallace, Wright, & Hyde, 2014).  This 
prejudice and discrimination often become political and polarized (Ghumman & Ryan, 
2013; Hauslohner, 2017; Khera & Smith, 2017; Taras, 2013).  For example, in the United 
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States, the Republican Party often brands itself as the party of “family values” in an 
appeal to Christian Evangelicals, and in doing so invokes biblical doctrine (Patrikios, 
2008; Tavits & Potter, 2015).  As a counterpoint, the Democratic Party’s more secular 
platform is criticized by the right as an attack on their religious values, creating an “us” 
versus “them” culture conflict over what constitutes American values (Patrikios, 2008). 
Interestingly enough, this type of culture conflict spurs the Christian majority into 
often claiming themselves the target of discrimination; they lament a future of an 
America losing its Christian identity (Coston & Kimmel, 2012; Jones et al., 2016).  
Referred to as Christonormativity, this phenomenon is the result of Christian dominance 
and privilege in the United States (Ferber, 2012; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2008).  Some 
researchers even suggest that Christianity is so dominant in U.S. culture, that it can be 
implicated in all other categories of oppression (e.g., racism, sexism, heterosexism, 
ableism, classism, etc.) as the cause justified by biblical arguments (e.g., Bible verses that 
refer to gay sex as an abomination, women as subordinate to men, other religions as 
worthy of death; Ferber, 2012; Todd, 2010).  Examples of studies in this area include (a) 
changing perceptions of Americans toward Middle Eastern immigrants as they have 
shifted from majority-Christian to majority-Muslim and (b) the prevalence of Christian 
privilege in schools that marginalize all non-Christian students (Blumenfeld, Joshi, & 
Fairchild, 2009; Nelson, 2009; Tehranian, 2009). 
While many Christian groups are vocal about the perceived lack of religious 
freedom, these groups are often able to discriminate against women, the LGBT 
community, immigrants, Muslims, and the nonreligious (e.g., Gerstein, 2016; Hiltzik, 
48 
 
2017).  Not only through public perception, but politically, Christians wield a great deal 
of power, enabling them to legislate their values through measures that: prevent women 
from obtaining access to abortion and birth control, laws that restrict transgender 
bathroom use, challenge the legality of marriage equality, and fight against immigration, 
particularly Muslims (e.g., Masci & Lipka, 2015; Zapotosky, Nakamura, & Hauslohner, 
2017).  The nonreligious and atheist population of the US do not curry this favor with the 
predominately Christian Congress, and because of public perception and systemic 
prejudice and discrimination against the nonreligious, are unlikely to achieve elected 
status to empower themselves politically (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
 Atheists and Nonreligious.  It has been argued that sweeping anti-religious and 
anti-immigrant movements are often recycled in different regions and at different points 
in time, but utilize the same emotional rhetoric customized to target different groups 
(Casanova, 2012).  This can be seen in the 19th-century toward Catholic immigrants in 
America, which was largely supported through nativism, and is currently taking place in 
Europe and America targeting Muslim immigrants (Casanova, 2012).  Another example 
of this was during the American “Red Scare” that fueled a great deal of anti-Asian, anti-
communist, and anti-atheist attitudes and policies in the US (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013).  
Atheist prejudice and discrimination in the U.S. is prevalent, with citizens disliking 
atheists more than any religious group and over half stating they would not support an 
atheist candidate for president (Lipka, 2016a).  This could be partly because the U.S. is 
comparatively more religious than other developed nations, or it could be related to the 
rhetoric that fueled fear of “godless communism” (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013). 
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Atheists have faced a variety of types of discrimination within the U.S.  Atheism 
is a concealable identity that carries enormous stigma, and like other stigmatized groups 
(e.g., LGBT), choose to remain “in the closet” for fear of backlash (Johnson, Rowatt, & 
LaBouff, 2012; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).  This concealable stigmatized identity (CSI) 
presents problems both for those who choose to “out” themselves as well as those who 
choose to conceal their identity for fear of discrimination (Cragun et al., 2012b; Doane & 
Elliot, 2015; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).  A recent study concluded that traditional polling 
methods do not account for this stigmatization and as such even with anonymity, atheists 
do not self-identify as such through direct poll questions (Gervais & Najle, 2017).  
However, through the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation, the study 
found that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% of the population with greater than .99 
probability and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability (Gervais & Najle, 2017).  The 
most credible estimate was 26%, which is much larger than the Pew reported figure of 
3.1% (Gervais & Najle, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014a). 
At present, open atheist identification is difficult as evidence suggests that atheists 
who do openly identify face verbal abuse, ostracism, prejudice and discrimination, and 
are targets of hate crimes (Giddings & Dunn, 2016; Hammer, Cragun, Hwang, & Smith, 
2012).  For example, some court cases have denied custody to one parent simply because 
of atheist identification (Volokh, 2006).  Atheists are also targets of hiring and job 
discrimination (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Wallace et al., 2014).  They are 
also targets of political discrimination, making it difficult for atheists to run for or be 
elected to public office (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Recently, Mark Zuckerberg, who had 
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been an open atheist recanted his atheist identification, and many believed this is because 
he aspires to be elected to office, and open atheism is considered “political suicide” 
(Solon, 2017).  Given the pervasiveness of anti-atheist prejudice and discrimination, it is 
noteworthy that research documenting it began as recently as the 2000s.  
Research documenting the perceptions of atheist morality has been the major 
focal point of anti-atheist studies, with a great deal of evidence supporting the belief that 
atheists are immoral and therefore not trustworthy (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 
2006; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Gervais, 2013).  Experiments asking 
participants to judge who would likely have committed serial murder, consensual incest, 
necrobestiality, and cannibalism found that American participants intuitively believed 
these actions to be representative of atheists, more so than eleven other religious, ethnic, 
and cultural groups (Gervais, 2014).  This type of prejudice has been found to be very 
resilient, with some studies suggesting anti-atheist prejudice is best explained by the 
perception that atheists lack the capacity for caring, kindness, and compassion, while 
other studies find atheists are viewed as repugnant and as such elicit moral disgust 
(Anderson, 2016; Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012a; 
Mudd, Najle, Ng, & Gervais, 2015; Simpson & Rios, 2016).  One study even suggests 
American participants found beverages more disgusting tasting after copying a passage 
from either the Qur’an or the book The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins (Ritter & 
Preston, 2011).  Interestingly, this study also found that allowing participants to wash 
their hands following the copying of the passage, eliminated the disgust, suggesting that 
symbolic disgust manifests physically and removing it protects an individual’s moral 
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values (Ritter & Preston, 2011).  In 2015, researchers examining existential threats found 
that atheists prompt the religious to question their beliefs and think about death, creating 
a fear threat reaction, which increased disparagement, social distancing, and distrust of 
atheists (Cook, Cohen, & Solomon, 2015).  Together it suggests that anti-atheist 
prejudice is highly complex and further investigation is necessary to explain the 
underrepresentation of atheists in political office.  
Researchers have tested strategies for eliminating anti-atheist prejudice.  Some 
suggest that research questions frame atheism as positive (e.g., the majority of scientists 
and academics are nonbelievers) and that skepticism has become increasingly necessary 
in society, thus it is a valued trait and the natural outcome of skepticism may be 
agnosticism or atheism (Caldwell-Harris, 2012).  This concept was furthered by 
Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) in their discussion of the origin and evolution of 
religious disbelief.  Studies have used imaginative scenarios or priming methods, finding 
that (a) priming secular concepts or (b) showing visuals of interactions with atheists 
decreases bias and prejudice (Gervais, 2011; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012b; LaBouff & 
Ledoux, 2016; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, & Finkle, 2012).  This is especially important 
regarding institutions of government and power, such as police, court systems, and 
government officials, as evidence suggests that foregrounding secular rule of law 
decreases political intolerance and prejudice toward atheists (Norenzayan & Gervais, 
2015).  Finding ways to minimize anti-atheist prejudice is a necessary step toward 
increasing their political representation. 
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While most of the anti-atheist literature has focused on morality, little research 
has examined atheist prejudice and discrimination in a political context despite their 
conspicuous underrepresention in elected office.  Franks and Scherr (2014) examined 
anti-atheist prejudice in politics and found that atheist candidates faced greater levels of 
distrust, disgust, and fear, as well as decreased voter intention compared to other 
historically marginalized candidates such as African American and gay males.  Other 
studies have confirmed that religious identity labeling plays a role in how an individual is 
perceived (Charles, Rowland, Long, & Yarrison, 2012; Swan & Heesacker, 2012).  With 
this in mind, it is expected that examining religious identity in a political context would 
place even greater importance on the religious identity-participant perception 
relationship, given the importance of political positions. 
Franks and Scherr (2017) and Franks (2017) expanded on this research to 
understand anti-atheist prejudice in a political context.  Franks and Scherr (2017) found 
that analytic thinking (operationalized for the study as performance on the Cognitive 
Reflections Test) increased acceptance of secular ideas and reduced anti-atheist prejudice 
(operationalized as the participant’s willingness to vote for the atheist).  However, it may 
be difficult to prime analytic thinking in a real-world election, and other research that has 
attempted to prime analytic thinking did not find reduced anti-atheist bias, suggesting that 
where the study takes place (e.g., church vs. school) and the type of sample may alter the 
results (Sanchez, Sumdermeier, Gray, & Calin-Jageman, 2017).  For example, voters 
facing a polling location with confusing and complex voting rules and long lines may 
resort to intuitive and emotion-based (Berger, Meredith, & Weaver, 2008; Eidelman, 
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Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Franks & Scherr, 2017; Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).  
Franks (2017) also found that while informational manipulations (e.g., suggesting an 
atheist candidate is popular to participant groups) improved voter intention for the 
candidate, Christian participants still preferred a Christian candidate similar to 
themselves.  It was noted however, that the participants were more likely to consider the 
atheist candidate if the Christian candidate was labeled a theocrat (Franks, 2017).  This 
suggests that pejorative representation of a religious candidate or ideology (e.g., referring 
to a fringe or nontraditional religion as a cult) may alter perceptions and value 
assessments of the candidate and therefore voter intentions. 
Nontraditional Religious Groups.  It is not yet known how nontraditional 
religious groups would compare to the nonreligious in a political contest; however, it is 
known that these groups also face discrimination.  Many major religions paradoxically 
present both prosocial and aggressive tendencies.  Research examining this paradox in 
both Catholic and Protestant Christians found that different presentations of God 
prompted different behaviors from believers (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013).  When 
God is presented as an authoritarian figure (e.g., controlling, commanding, or punishing) 
Christians were more likely to behave aggressively toward outgroups (Johnson et al., 
2013).  When God was instead presented as benevolent (e.g., helping, forgiving, or 
protecting) Christians were more likely to engage in volunteerism and provide aid to 
outgroups (Johnson et al., 2013).  Further, when God concepts were experimentally 
manipulated for non-Catholic Christians, the benevolent God increased an individual’s 
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willingness to forgive others, whereas the authoritarian God decreased forgiveness 
(Johnson et al., 2013).  Many stories of the Christian God frequently depict a figure that 
demands obedience, so these findings paint a grim picture for groups seeking to avoid 
prejudice from traditional Christians in the U.S. 
Groups that either (a) receive a great deal of attention in the media such as 
Muslim immigrants, (b) are increasing in popularity and in the number of adherents such 
as atheists, or (c) have practices too far removed from the mainstream religion such as 
Scientology, are likely to be targets of Christian prejudice.  A study seeking to examine 
perceptions of cults presented participants with descriptions of indoctrination practices 
for groups labeled the Marines, the Catholic Church, and the Moonies, where 
indoctrination practices were identical for each group.  A vignette was presented of a 
young man joining either the Marines, the Catholic Seminary, or the Moonies.  
Participants were then asked to evaluate each of the practices, and researchers noted 
variations among participant perceptions simply as a result of the group’s identity 
(Pfeifer, 1992).  Participants were more likely to prefer the term “brainwashing” to 
describe the techniques of the Moonies, “resocialization” for the techniques of the 
Catholic Church, and “conversion” for the techniques of the Marines, despite their 
identical descriptions (Pfeifer, 1992).  Further, the man was judged to have been coerced 
into joining the Moonies and participants were more likely to rate a negative description 
of cult activity as more accurate than a positive description.  This means that people’s 
evaluations of an indoctrination process are often based on emotional reactions from 
negative schematic representations, rather than an objective evaluation of the group’s 
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practices.  The study examined how individuals view cults and their practices and found 
that public perception is more powerful than the practices of the group itself.  
Furthermore, the study found that people generally were not well-informed about groups 
considered to be cults, and much of the information individuals did possess was acquired 
secondhand based on public perceptions rather than accurate information (Pfeifer, 1992). 
Many minority and nontraditional religions in the U.S. are often labeled as a cult 
by the general population, if the group is newly established or has practices considered 
too far removed from those of the mainstream.  Research suggests that many Americans 
are prejudice toward Mormons specifically as they perceive the religion as smaller and 
newer comparative to other mainstream religions, and older religious practices are 
viewed as more stable and pure (Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010; Heise, 2013; 
Warner & Kiddoo, 2014).  This makes Pfeifer’s (1992) findings relevant to the public 
perception of smaller or newer religious groups (e.g., Scientologists and Mormons).  Both 
religions were founded in the United States (considered a comparatively “new” country), 
and both have a small percentage of adherents compared to mainstream religions and 
even compared to the atheist population.  An interesting consideration of studies 
examining cult perceptions is identifying a group as a cult, which can be difficult.  First, 
no religious group or adherent considers themselves as a cult or cultist, while the general 
public tends to view newer or nontraditional religions as cults, suggesting that outsiders 
of the religion view them negatively (Cragun et al., 2012a).  The literature on cult 
identification only further complicates this issue finding it difficult to determine which 
groups are considered a cult and which are not.  Richardson (1993) states that the term 
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cult was once understood to refer to a religious group with a charismatic founder and 
these groups were contrasted with other religious organizational types.  However, now 
the term cult is a pejorative used as a catch-all that refers to any unusual religious groups 
and their activities (Lalich, 2009; Richardson, 1993).  Groups that are a part of the 
anticult movement (ACM) successfully utilized the tactic of labeling a religious group as 
a cult to curry public support for raids of the Fundamentalists Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints in 2008 and the Waco Branch Davidians in 1993 (Barker, 1986; 
Wright, 2011; Wright & Fagen, 2011).  
Olson (2006) suggests that relabeling the term cult to “New Religious Movement” 
or “New Christian Church” reduced negative attitudes.  Furthermore, New Christian 
Church garnered the most positive responses, implying that there is a differentiation 
between a new religious group and a new Christian group (Olson, 2006).  A study 
conducted by Cragun, Henry, Homan, and Hammer (2012) compared attitudes toward 
cult members and atheists and found that the students surveyed held greater negative 
attitudes toward cultists than atheists.  However, the context for this study was not 
political.  Furthermore, the study compared atheists and “cult members” and did not use 
any real-world religious examples of a group that may be considered a cult to the general 
public (e.g., Scientologists or Mormons).    
The proposed study, inspired by the Cragun et al. (2012a) and Franks and Scherr 
(2014) studies, seeks to bridge this gap, by providing actual nontraditional religious 
examples (i.e., Scientologists and Mormons), often depicted as cult-like, in a political 
context.  The proposed study seeks to compare candidates from each religious affiliation 
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with atheist candidates to assess the electability of atheists candidates with other, 
typically reviled religious groups.  
One religious group that often receives negative attention is the Church of 
Scientology (Doherty, 2014; McAllister, 2013).  The unusual structure and teachings of 
the church have led many to believe the church leadership uses brainwashing techniques 
to maintain control of its members. This is in part a result of the history of the Church’s 
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, who is often positioned as a cult leader with ties to the famous 
occultist Aleister Crowley (Urban, 2012).  The reclusive nature of the church combined 
with media portrayals and interviews from individuals who have “escaped,” reinforce the 
image of the church as a cult (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm, 
2015). 
Another religious group that frequently receives negative attention is the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, commonly referred to as the Mormon Church.  
Despite the fact the church is a Christian denomination, its divergence from mainstream 
Christian doctrine makes it the target of religious prejudice (Penning, 2009).  It has been 
argued that the prejudice and discrimination Mormons face is similar to 19th Century 
Catholics and modern-day Muslims in America (Grow, 2004; Penning, 2009).  However, 
Catholics now enjoy a great deal of power and political relevance, whereas the Mormon 
Church has yet to accomplish this feat (Grow, 2004).  An article posted on a site hosted 
by the Protestant-affiliated Liberty University argues that the cosmology argument 
presented by the Mormon Church is too similar to evolution and therefore justifies 
Mormonism’s defeat (Pruitt, 2014).  Historical review and academic studies contend that 
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a great deal of the negative perception of Mormons stems from the belief that Mormons 
devalue women (e.g., polygamy).  Furthermore, when individuals believe the church is a 
newer religion, they desire greater social distance (the levels of intimacy tolerated) from 
the church (Heise, 2013; Warner & Kiddoo, 2014).  Greater social distance toward a 
group is a sign of greater levels of prejudice as well as less positivity toward the group 
(Warner & Kiddoo, 2014).  Groups and practices perceived as older are viewed more 
positively (stable and entitative) than those that are relatively new (Eidelman, Pattershall, 
& Crandall, 2010).  As the Mormon Church is the only major religion established on 
American soil (in 1830) the religion itself is viewed as new, and this study found that the 
view “older is better” extends to adherents of a group and not just the group itself 
(Warner & Kiddoo, 2014).   
Politically, the Mormon candidates may find themselves in a difficult position, as 
the conservatives struggle to view them as “Christian” and liberals find them too 
repressive (Smith, 2014; Smith, 2016).  During the 2007 election cycle, Mitt Romney’s 
religion was a major focal point of media coverage, accounting for 30 percent of his total 
media coverage and 50 percent of all religion-related presidential primary stories (Baker 
& Campbell, 2010).  A later evaluation of the candidacy of Mormon presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney found that many conservatives were hesitant to vote for him, 
particularly those that did not strongly identify as a Republican. However for those 
individuals that did strongly identify as a Republican, party identity and the desire for 
their candidate to win led many Christian voters to identify Mormons as Christian and 
reconcile voting for Romney (Smith, 2016).  However, overall voter aversion to 
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Mormons is increasing as a result of Romney’s candidacy (Smith, 2014).  Surveys 
examining voter intentions and feelings following the 2008 election find that 
conservatives do not want to vote for a Mormon candidate, as “they are not really 
Christian” and liberals do not want to vote for a Mormon candidate because they 
“represent a repressive religious coalition” (Smith, 2014).  A separate study found voters 
in the 2008 election were more concerned with Romney’s religious affiliation than any 
other candidate (Campbell, Green, & Monson, 2012).  Furthermore, exposure to 
Mormons related directly to individual perceptions of Mormons.  Those voters who had 
no prior exposure to Mormons were likely to be persuaded by both negative and positive 
information, while voters with sustained Mormon contact were not likely persuaded by 
information either way.  Most interestingly, voters with moderate contact reacted the 
strongest to negative information about Mormons but were not persuaded by positive 
information (Campbell et al., 2012).  Given that Mormons are only 1.6% of the U.S. 
population, this may explain why findings indicate a rise in voter aversion toward 
Mormon candidates following Romney (Pew Research Center, 2014b; Smith, 2014).  
This may also suggest that atheist candidates may face the same obstacles, given their 
population size (3.1%) and the odds of the average person interacting with atheists 
regularly (Pew Research Center, 2014a).  As a result, it is important to consider the role 
of religious identity and subsequent voter intention. 
Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and Discrimination as a Function of Social Identity 
 Some social identity literature emphasizes prejudice and discrimination as an 
aspect of outgroup threat perceptions.  Other studies instead focus on prejudice as a 
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function of ingroup favoritism, with no malicious intent (Dunkel & Dutton, 2016).  An 
example of the latter would be employment networking.  Employers frequently ask 
employees to refer their qualified acquaintances to apply for positions within the 
company.  However, most people affiliate with others similar to themselves culturally 
and ideologically (e.g., ethnicity, religious identity).  This can create unintentional 
segregation in a workplace when networking is largely responsible for job applicants and 
hiring, leading to unintentional discrimination toward applicants from different 
backgrounds simply because they were never considered to begin with (Greenwald & 
Pettigrew, 2014).  This type of discrimination is, therefore, a function of networking and 
ingroup preference rather than outgroup prejudice based on threat perceptions and 
hostility (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014).  The authors argue, further, that discrimination 
need not involve hostile prejudicial emotions, but simply be the act of treating others 
unfairly or unequally “because of” race, skin color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or 
disability status, regardless of any intention to do so (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014).  
While this ingroup favoritism may explain certain facets of how atheists become 
marginalized politically (e.g., Christians are more likely to vote for candidates like 
themselves) research suggests atheists are viewed as criminal and threatening (e.g., 
Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais et al., 2017).  Therefore, the 
more closely an individual’s religious identity mirrors that of the target subject, the more 
likely the individual is to accept, or in the case of the proposed study, vote for the similar 
person while expressing prejudice toward dissimilar persons. 
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It has been said that while individuals choose their ideologies, ideologies likewise 
choose the people, based on the needs of those people and how maintaining that specific 
belief structure serves those needs (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).  For example, it has 
been argued that Christian theology is not only useful in providing a moral code for its 
adherents, but also useful as a weapon to protect Christians from outgroups that are 
deemed threatening (Ferber, 2012; Todd, 2010).  It is this function of social identity that 
appears the most relevant to the proposed study, given the extreme emotional responses 
typically associated with anti-atheist prejudice (Cook et al., 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2014; 
Gervais et al., 2017).  As Katz (1960) suggested, attitudes serve a specific function, and 
the function served determines what may arouse or alter the attitude.  Ego-defensive 
attitudes are aroused by perceived threats, appeals of hatred, repressed impulses, and 
authoritarian suggestion, whereas value-expressive attitudes are aroused by cues related 
to the individual’s values and need to reassert self-image (Katz, 1960).  As religious 
identity serves both functions, it is particularly salient, and volatile when challenged.   
Emotional Responses Association with Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and 
Discrimination 
 Emotional responses related to ingroup/outgroup bias and prejudice are typically a 
function of perceived threats and the emotions that underlie them (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005).  Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011), Franks and Scherr (2014), and Cook, 
Cottrell, and Webster (2015) find strong evidence that atheists are viewed as a threat to 
physical safety (fear response) and a threat to group values (disgust response).  
Furthermore, perceptions of religion leave individuals believing religious belief is 
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necessary to promote important prosocial behaviors such as cooperation and morality and 
to protect the social order.  This means people believe if religion offers prosocial benefits, 
an individual lacking religious belief does not offer these benefits (Cook et al., 2015; 
Franks and Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2011).  In a study examining emotional responses, 
prejudice, and voting behavior, a positive relationship was found between disgust 
sensitivity and political conservativism (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012).  Given what 
is known about atheists in relation to moral threat perceptions and feelings of disgust, 
conservatism may be a strong predictor of anti-atheist prejudice, and party identity may 
also predict participant voting based solely on religious identities. 
Voting Behavior as a Function of Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and Discrimination 
Voting behavior is often linked to group behavior and identity (Ben-Bassat & 
Dahan, 2012).  Furthermore, voting behavior and its relationship to prejudice and 
discrimination has been examined in several election cycles, with the most prominent 
being the 2008 presidential election.  Researchers found that individuals with greater 
levels of explicit racial and ethnic prejudice were less likely to vote for Barack Obama 
and more likely to vote for John McCain (Payne et al., 2010).  However, individuals with 
higher levels of implicit ethnic and racial prejudice, while more unlikely to vote for 
Obama were not more likely to vote for McCain, instead choosing to abstain or vote for a 
third-party candidate (Payne et al., 2010).  A study examining affective reactions to 
policies that benefit marginalized and historically discriminated against groups accurately 
predicted that if the individual held a prejudicial emotion such as disgust toward 
homosexuals, a policy that benefited homosexuals was also viewed as disgusting 
63 
 
(Cottrell, Richards, & Nichols, 2010).  Importantly, general affect measures of prejudice 
(e.g., measuring general feelings or averaging specific emotions for a composite index of 
general affect) did not accurately predict policy attitudes, but measures of specific 
emotions (e.g., disgust) did (Cottrell et al., 2010).  Furthermore, a study comparing 
affective polarization across party lines found that participants were not only immediately 
hostile (as measured by implicit association tests) to nonpartisan targets (e.g., a person 
with a different party affiliation) but that the responses were stronger in intensity than 
racial prejudice (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).  As such, voting behavior is strongly 
linked to ingroup identity and those in the outgroup engender strong negative emotions 
and prejudice.   
Results from three separate studies find that participants will abstain from voting 
when the election lacks candidates who endorse their specific moral concerns and values 
(Johnson et al., 2014).  These concerns include care and fairness, which predicted voting 
intention for liberal voters, while loyalty, authority, and sanctity concerns predicted 
voting intentions for conservatives (Johnson et al., 2014).  Taken together with other 
studies, these findings suggest atheists must be aware of the social identity they present 
as well as demonstrate an ability to show kindness and caring in order to improve voting 
intentions toward them (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Simpson & Rios, 2017).  If the 
atheist candidate does not present a strong party identity, with an emphasis on that party’s 
values, voters may simply focus on the atheist identity and their current perceptions of 
atheists, continuing the cycle of atheist unelectability.   
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Analyses of far-right leaders suggest that these leaders can influence 
discriminatory action without directly using words associated with discrimination 
(Verkuyten, 2013).  One example is the characterization of Islam as a doctrine used for 
violent political and religious ends versus Islam as a religion embraced and practiced by 
Muslim people.  By framing the two as separate from one another, leaders have 
effectively defined Islam as an external threat to Western values, while simultaneously 
resisting accusations of prejudice (Verkuyten, 2013).  Similar tactics could be used 
against atheists as well, by associating atheism with communism, similar to Cold War 
strategies used to contrast the democratic Christian United States with Russia’s godless 
tyranny (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013).  While other historically marginalized groups (e.g., 
Blacks and the LGBT) have made large gains in political representation in the last few 
decades relative to their population size, gaining proportional atheist representation will 
likely be more difficult (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Religion informs U.S. society as both a 
belief system and a social identity that atheists are perceived to stand in complete contrast 
to and against.  Not only are individuals more likely to trust a political candidate that 
references God, but these references to God also reduce perceptions of a nation in decline 
(Shepherd, Eibach, & Kay, 2016).  Overcoming such barriers will be difficult, but 
research may offer the best way to accomplish a representative government and 
ameliorate the problem of atheist unelectability. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the comparative unelectability of 
atheist political candidates because of perceived threats that elicit negative emotional 
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responses (e.g., distrust, disgust, and fear).  The findings may help alleviate this problem 
and promote positive social change by achieving greater atheist representation and 
legislative equality.  Both the Social Identity Theory and the socio-functional approach 
informed this study.  Social Identity Theory suggests that participants will most likely 
support candidates similar to themselves and less likely to support candidates dissimilar 
to themselves, while the socio-functional approach to prejudice allows for the 
measurement of participants’ emotional reactions to each candidate (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
 People view atheists as immoral and untrustworthy, making it difficult for atheists 
to gain political representation (Gervais, 2013; Gervais et al., 2011).  While some 
examination of atheists in political settings has revealed atheists face more difficulty 
obtaining elected status than Black or gay men, no study has compared the comparative 
electability of atheists and nontraditional religious candidates (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
The aim of this study is to provide further insight into the problem of atheist 
unelectability. 
 To examine the comparative electability of atheist and nontraditional religious 
candidates, Chapter 3 describes the research design and approach used to answer the 
research questions.  Sampling, instruments, and the statistical methods utilized to analyze 
the data will are also provided. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 The underrepresentation of atheists in political office denies them the legislative 
power enjoyed by other groups (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2014a; 
Sandstrom, 2017).  Pervasive anti-atheist prejudice results in job discrimination, 
difficulty winning child custody cases, and attacks in the public sphere based solely on a 
lack of religious belief (e.g., Holland, 2015; Mehta, 2017; Wallace et al., 2014; Wing, 
2015).  Were atheists represented in elected office proportional to their representation in 
the general population, they would be in a better position to address issues concerning 
them.  The purpose of this study is to examine the (a) comparative electability of atheists 
to other nontraditional religious candidates and (b) emotions that underlie the prejudice 
these candidates may face.  To date, no study has examined the comparative electability 
of American atheists to other nontraditional religious political candidates.  Research 
examining the electability of atheists is necessary to ameliorate the problem of their 
underrepresentation, and in doing so, establishment of a more representative government. 
 This chapter presents information on the quantitative methodology the proposed 
study will utilize, as well as participant recruitment and sample size information.  The 
measurement instruments are described as well as the rationale for their use.  The 
independent, dependent, and confounding variables are discussed, as well as the validity 
and reliability of previous studies utilizing similar methodology and instruments.  Data 
collection procedures and analysis strategies are presented.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the ethical procedures taken to protect participants.  
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Research Design and Rationale 
 This study examines atheist electability to political office by measuring (a) voter 
intention and (b) emotional responses to (d) political candidates based on their (d) 
religious affiliation relative to the (e) participant’s religious identity.  A quantitative 
design was chosen for this study as it is appropriate for examining relationships among 
variables.  Qualitative designs do not rely on statistical analyses, and instead are more 
exploratory in nature.  The constructs to be assessed have been explored in previous 
research, some of which used a similar framework and methodology (e.g., Franks & 
Scherr, 2014, Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015).  Furthermore, a quantitative design 
allows the study to be replicated more easily to verify the results across different samples 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  Two independent variables (a) participant religious identity 
and (b) candidate religious identity with at least four levels each (i.e., Protestant, 
Scientologist, Mormon, and atheist) and four dependent variables (i.e., voter intention, 
disgust, distrust, and fear) were examined to determine the relationship among them.  
This factorial design is necessary to consider multiple factors together at once.   
The participant’s voting intentions were measured by the voter likelihood scale 
while the three emotional reactions (e.g., disgust, distrust, and fear) were measured by 
three 7-point semantic differential scales.  The research questions presented served as a 
guide to assessing the statistical significance of the candidate’s religious identity (IV) and 
its interaction with the participant’s religious identity (IV) and the main effects on voter 
intention (DV), disgust (DV), distrust (DV), and fear (DV).  One potential constraint may 
be the difficulty in getting a sufficient number of participants for the rarer religious 
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identities such as Scientology.  However, as the main focus of the study is majority 
prejudice against the minority religious groups, this will not impede completion of this 
study. 
The purpose of this study is to compare the electability of and emotional 
responses to political candidates who represent traditional and nontraditional religious 
affiliations, where voting intentions were used as a proxy to measure prejudice.  The 
research questions ask (a) if atheists experience greater discrimination when seeking 
political office than candidates of nontraditional religious identities, (b) if participants are 
more likely to vote or not vote for a candidate based on a similar or dissimilar religious 
identity, and (c) which types of political candidate religious identities will rate worse on 
the semantic scales regarding distrust, disgust, and fear.   
Methodology 
Population 
The target population selected for this study is United States citizens over the age 
of 18 that are legally allowed to vote.  Recent reports of registered and eligible voters 
place this population size at 218,959,000 (Goldmacher, 2016; Krogstad, 2016).  
Individuals unable to read in English and those who do not have access to the Internet 
will not be able to participate.   
Sampling 
 Any research that uses the Internet to host surveys and collect data is utilizing a 
type of nonprobability sampling strategy known as convenience sampling.  The perk of 
this method is the easily accessible participants; however, as with any nonrandom 
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sampling method, there is no guarantee of accurately capturing a representative sample of 
the population.  The Internet does allow greater access to larger and more diverse 
samples, but it is unlikely the sample will be truly representative.  For example, the study 
may unintentionally eliminate lower socioeconomic individuals who do not have Internet 
access.  Use of the Internet as a tool for sampling and hosting the survey was chosen to 
minimize costs of conducting the study, to conveniently sample a large and diverse 
group, and the convenience to participants.  Survey Monkey both hosts the survey and 
recruits participants via social media Internet advertising.  
Power Analysis 
An a priori analysis for an ANOVA with fixed effects, special-main effects, and 
interactions utilizing G*Power suggested the study would require a sample size of 256 
total participants (N = 256) to produce a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .5), with a 
power level of .80, and an alpha level of .05 (Cohen, 1969).  This includes the necessary 
analyses with the 4 levels of the two independent variables, the 4 types of dependent 
variables, the interaction of independent and dependent variables, and posthoc 
comparisons (64 participants in each level of the 4-level variables).  As such, participants 
were randomly assigned one of four candidates, each candidate having a minimum of 64 
participant responses each.  The power of a test of statistical significance (.80) is defined 
as the probability the test will reject the null hypothesis when it should (avoiding a Type 
II error), essentially meaning there is an 80% chance of finding differences or 
relationships among variables if they actually exist.  This power is affected by the effect 
size and the size of the sample.  In the social sciences and specifically in similar studies 
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to this one, the power level is generally accepted as .80 or greater, and thus why it was 
chosen here.  The alpha level of .05 means there is a 5% chance of a Type I error 
occurring, and was chosen as conventional for social science studies as well as to match 
similar previous studies.  Effect size serves only as an estimate, as it cannot be calculated 
until after data collection, however researchers typically estimate a moderate to large 
effect size during power analysis, and studies similar to this one used Cohen’s d to 
calculate effect size during analyses, and is why it was chosen here.  Each value is not 
only conventional for similar social science studies, but should also minimize errors and 
demonstrate greater significance in the statistical findings if a relationship between 
variables exists. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Following Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, the 
survey was hosted using the online survey site Survey Monkey, along with the candidate 
descriptions and requests for demographic data such as participant age (legal voting age 
and age of consent is 18 years of age), participant religious and political affiliation.  
Using an online setting allows for greater access to a random and diverse sample, as well 
as larger numbers of participants.  The survey began with a consent form, informing 
participants by entering the survey, they give consent to participate.  This form states that 
by continuing with the survey, the participant acknowledges they are at least 18 years old, 
is able to read in English, and resides in the United States.  Further, participants were 
informed of the confidential and voluntary nature of the study, that participants may end 
participation at any time or refrain from answering any questions, and that participants 
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should not include any personally identifying information (e.g., name).  The form 
concluded with appropriate contact information for the university and researcher should 
any questions or concerns arise.  Participants pushed an “I Agree” button to proceed and 
an “I Do Not Agree” button to discontinue. 
Participants were recruited online using Survey Monkey, with postings to other 
sites provided by the hosting site.  Further, postings were made to the social media 
website Facebook to religious group pages (e.g., Mormon, Scientologist, atheist) in order 
to attract a variety of religious identities to participate.  The survey was also posted on 
sites aimed at attracting research participants such as Call for Participants and The 
Inquisitive Mind.  The survey was also later posted on Reddit.  The recruitment flyer 
asked participants to evaluate political candidates to determine how much information is 
necessary to form accurate impressions; this slightly obscured the true purpose of the 
study (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  A copy of the recruitment flyer can be found in the 
appendices.  If told they were being assessed for prejudice and ingroup preferences, 
participants’ responses may reflect a social desirability response (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  Participants were asked to read about a candidate running for 
the U.S. House of Representatives, and were told the information may be about any 
aspect of the candidate’s life or personality.  The political candidate was described as a 
39-year-old male named, John, whose political agenda prioritizes the economy, health 
care, and education (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Participants were randomly assigned, using 
Survey Monkey tools, to read about one of four candidates, identified as: Protestant, 
atheist, Scientologist, or Mormon.  The sample (N = 256) was divided into four groups 
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(64 participants per candidate type).  Each participant reviewed one of the four candidate 
descriptions.   
Following this, participants indicated their likelihood of voting for that candidate 
using the voter likelihood scale and the three 7-point semantic differential scales 
measuring distrust, disgust, and fear.  The candidate description and subsequent surveys 
were estimated to take approximately 10 minutes to complete.  At the conclusion of the 
survey, participants were directed to a page thanking them for their participation, 
providing them with the true purpose of the study, and debriefing information; they were 
provided with university and researcher emails for questions or concerns related to the 
study. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
 Using the socio-functional approach as their framework, Franks and Scherr 
(2014) developed the three 7-point semantic differential scales to measure disgust, 
distrust, and fear along with the voter likelihood scale to measure voter intention.  Using 
the socio-functional approach, Franks and Scherr (2014) developed these measures to 
examine anti-atheist prejudice in political settings.  There are no psychometrics reported 
for these measures beyond the pilot study for terminology and the significance measures 
reported within the study.  This study utilized these measures along with a similar 
candidate description used by Franks and Scherr (2014); however, religious affiliation 
will be manipulated rather than sexual orientation or race.  These tools were developed in 
a pilot study prior to the Franks and Scherr (2014) study which determined the word 
choices for each of the three emotions (e.g., distrust, disgust, and fear).  Informed by anti-
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atheist prejudice research, these scales measure perceptions of atheist morality and 
trustworthiness (e.g., Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  Permission for 
use of the scales can be found in the appendices. 
Demographic Questions 
 Demographic questions followed the consent page and asked the participant for 
their religious and political affiliation, age, gender, education level, race, and 
socioeconomic status.  This information ensures a diverse sample has been obtained, 
improving the generalizability of the data as well as checking for differences across 
groups to address potential demographic confounds. 
Candidate Description 
Participants were randomly assigned one of four candidates running for the U.S. 
House of Representatives to review.  This description is similar to the candidate 
description used in the Franks and Scherr (2014) study.  The candidates were described 
as follows: John is a 39-year-old [religious identity] male running for the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from 
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time 
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda 
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education.  The only variance in candidate 
descriptions will be the religious affiliation (e.g., Protestant, atheist, Scientologist, or 
Mormon).  The full description for each candidate can be found in the appendices.   
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Three 7-Point Semantic Differential Scales 
 Each participant was asked to complete three separate 7-point semantic 
differential scales, developed by Franks and Scherr (2014) to measure prejudice toward 
atheist political candidates.  Each scale measured participants’ feelings of trust, fear, and 
disgust toward the candidate.  Scale values range from “1” (untrustworthy, threatening, 
and disgusting), to “7” (trustworthy, comforting, and appealing).  The three 7-point 
semantic differential scales can be found in the appendices. 
The three 7-point semantic differential scales for distrust, disgust, and fear were 
developed for a study examining anti-atheist prejudice in politics informed by the socio-
functional framework (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  A pilot study was conducted to 
determine the construct validity of an appropriate antonym for disgusting and an 
appropriate description for fear of bodily harm.  Frequencies were reported, with 18 out 
of 20 respondents agreeing the words were appropriate.  A copy of the pilot study and 
frequencies can be found in the appendices.  These scales were used to assess samples of 
the U.S. voting population, similar to the proposed study (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Statistical significance was demonstrated utilizing these scales, with Christian 
participants rating atheists less trustworthy (95% CI (0.71, 2.08), p < .001, d = 1.08), gay 
candidates more disgusting (95% CI (1.12, 2.51), p < .001, d = 1.18), and all minority 
candidates more threatening (gay Candidate, 95% CI (0.32, 1.64), p = .004, d = 0.79; 
atheist candidate, 95% CI (0.19, 1.44), p = .01, d = 0.67; and Black candidate, 95% CI (–
0.12, 1.29), p = .08, d = 0.45) than the White Christian candidate.  This study 
demonstrated the ability of the scales to measure participant disgust, distrust, and fear 
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toward target candidates.  Following data collection, Cronbach’s Alpha (to measure 
internal consistency) was measured and a factor analysis for unidimensionality was 
conducted.  As there are three semantic differential scales, the alpha and factor analysis 
were computed separately.  
Voter Likelihood Scale 
 Participants reported their intention to vote for the candidate using the voter 
likelihood scale developed by Franks and Scherr (2014).  Ranging from 1 (no chance) – 9 
(100% likely) the scale measures the likelihood participants will vote for each candidate.  
The voter likelihood scale can be found in the appendices.  Both this study and the Franks 
and Scherr (2014) study sampled portions of the U.S. voting population.  In the Franks 
and Scherr (2014) study, participants (N = 200) used the scale to report the likelihood of 
supporting a candidate type, and statistical significance was reported from the data 
collected utilizing the scale.  For example, Christians reported a significantly greater 
likelihood of voting for the White Christian candidate than the gay male candidate, 95% 
confidence interval (CI; 0.26, 2.20), p = .013, d = 0.70), and a greater likelihood of voting 
for the White Christian candidate than the atheist candidate, 95% confidence interval 
(1.13, 2.95), p < .001, d = 1.08), and significantly greater likelihood of voting for the 
Black male candidate than the atheist candidate, 95% confidence interval (0.44, 2.48), p = 
.005, d = 0.68).  The difference in voting intentions from the White Christian to the 
atheist candidate was especially large (i.e., d = 1.08), and the overall participant faith 
status by candidate type interaction effect was also significant for voting intentions, F(3, 
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167) = 8.01, p < .001, demonstrating the ability of the scale to measure voting intentions 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).  This measure has strong face validity.   
Data Analysis Plan 
The effect of the two independent variables (e.g., candidate and participant 
religious affiliation) on the four dependent variables (e.g., voter intention, distrust, fear, 
and disgust) was analyzed quantitatively with four separate 2 x 4 factorial ANOVAs 
using IBM-SPSS-24 software, where each of the two independent variables has four 
conditions (i.e., Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist).  Demographic data was 
assessed using descriptive statistical tests in SPSS.  The means and standard deviations 
were calculated.  Data was screened to include only U.S. citizens of legal voting age.  
Data cleansing was necessary only in cases with incomplete responses.  Both Survey 
Monkey and SPSS can be used to filter out incomplete cases; to minimize errors during 
analysis.  If there were insufficient distribution of cases in the eight cells of a 2 x 4 
factorial ANOVA, then the participant religious affiliation factor would have been 
discarded and only the 4-level candidate independent variable would be analyzed on each 
of the four dependent variables. 
Research Questions 
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking 
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-
mainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
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Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office 
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream 
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting 
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than 
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian 
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based 
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
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Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory 
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and 
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the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear 
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the socio-
functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales (Franks & 
Scherr, 2014). 
Each independent variable will have at least four levels (i.e., candidate and 
participant religious affiliation including Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist 
identities).  A factorial analysis of variance was selected as the appropriate statistical test 
of significance because there is more than one independent variable and each independent 
variable has at least four levels.  Furthermore, it is necessary to utilize a factorial 
ANOVA to test not only the main effect of the variables but to assess the interaction 
effect between the two independent variables.  This interaction effect between the 
candidate’s religious identity and the participant’s religious identity will be assessed, as 
will the dependent variables (main effect) of voting intention, disgust, distrust, and fear as 
measured by the voter likelihood scale and the three semantic differential scales, similar 
to the approach used by Franks and Scherr (2014).  As it is not possible to manipulate the 
participant’s religious affiliation, at least four separate analyses will be conducted to 
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compare participant religious identity to candidate religious identity, and the four 
dependent variables, with each analysis using one level of the two independent variables 
(e.g., Protestant candidate by Protestant candidate to voter intention, disgust, distrust, and 
fear).   
There are several methods of interpreting factorial ANOVA results.  While the 
simple main effects method is commonly used for studies with three or more factors, the 
proposed study focuses more on the interaction than the main effect.  Furthermore, 
interpreting the main effect in the presence of a statistically significant interaction effect 
could lead to erroneous conclusions.  For example, if a focus is placed exclusively on 
voting intentions (main effect) which will likely vary across candidates, the significance 
of any interaction between candidate and participant identities may be minimized during 
interpretation, resulting in less accurate conclusions.  As such, the ANOVA results will 
be interpreted using the pairwise comparison method, which is considered the most 
useful interpretation method for determining which combination of factors produces the 
most meaningful comparisons.  Main effects will be examined for significance with 
appropriate follow-up post-hoc analyses. 
Threats to Validity 
 Possible threats to validity included participant response rates, as well as the 
consideration of confounding variables.  Religious identification is a sensitive issue and 
atheist identification in particular is stigmatized; participants may not want to identify 
themselves as such.  The participants were told all responses are anonymous in hopes of 
mitigating this issue.  Demographic information was collected to minimize confounding 
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variables and determine generalizability.  Furthermore, the political candidates were 
presented to participants with no political party affiliation.  Political candidates’ policy 
issues have been framed in non-partisan terms, allowing participants to make their own 
inferences (e.g., prioritizes health care does not suggest if the candidate favors liberal or 
conservative policies on the topic).  Generalizability of the study may also be a threat to 
validity, as this survey is limited to participants that read in English and have Internet 
access, unintentionally lowering the chances low-socioeconomic individuals will be 
included in the study.  However, by collecting demographic data, variability in the 
sample was determined to help minimize this threat as much as possible.  Participants 
who did not complete the entire survey will not be included to avoid threats related to 
response rates.  
Ethical Procedures 
 This study will obtained approval from the Walden University IRB prior to 
collecting data.  Furthermore, this study adheres to all ethical guidelines required by the 
American Psychological Association’s (APA) Code of Conduct, such as maintaining 
participant confidentiality and informing the participants of their right to stop 
participation at any time (American Psychological Association, 2010).  Participants 
viewed an informed consent page prior to entering the survey, which will inform the 
participants of their rights and the voluntary nature of this study.  Data has been stored 
securely, as both the researcher’s computer and Survey Monkey are password protected.  
Data must be stored for a minimum of five years (American Psychological Association, 
2010), and data collected will be viewed only by the researcher.  Data disposal will be 
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achieved by permanently deleting the information utilizing commercial software 
designed to remove all data from a storage device such as Eraser.  This study was not 
expected to present psychological risks to the participants, however participants were 
provided contact information for the researcher and institution for any questions or 
concerns the participant might have as well as a debriefing form with instructions to print 
the form for participant records.  The debriefing page immediately followed the last 
question on the survey.  At this point, the purpose of the study was revealed, and 
participants were allowed to withdraw their data now that he or she is fully informed as to 
the intent and purpose of the study.  Information on resources such as the IRB and health 
resources that can be accessed either online or through telephone (as the survey is online 
and participants may be anywhere in the United States) were provided.  An “I Agree” 
button was present for participants to consent to submit their data, while an “I Do Not 
Agree” button was available to participants that choose to withdraw, and their data will 
be deleted from the form and not submitted.  A copy of the informed consent form and 
the debriefing form can be found in the appendices. 
Summary 
 This quantitative study will assess the comparative electability of atheist and 
nontraditional religious political candidates using an online survey.  Data was collected 
from over 256 participants representative of the U.S. voting population.  After the 
participants read a brief candidate description, they were asked to report their voter 
intention and emotional reactions to the candidate with the voter likelihood scale and the 
three 7-point semantic differential scales.  Data was analyzed with four separate 2 x 4 
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factorial analyses of variance using IBM-SPSS-24 software.  Participants entered the 
survey through a consent page, and exited the survey through a debriefing page.  All 
Walden University IRB and APA Code of Conduct procedures were adhered to.  Chapter 
4 describes the data analyses and findings. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to quantitatively assess the comparative electability 
of atheist political candidates with candidates from other nontraditional religious 
backgrounds.  This chapter describes the data collection, screening, and cleaning, as well 
as provides the descriptive statistics for the variables of study and summarizes the results 
of each factorial ANOVA. 
Research Questions 
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking 
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-
mainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office 
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream 
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting 
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than 
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian 
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
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Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based 
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological 
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood 
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social 
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
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Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory 
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and 
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? 
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of 
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the 
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear 
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the socio-
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functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales (Franks & 
Scherr, 2014). 
Data Collection 
 Data collection began March 29, 2018, following approval from the IRB.  The 
survey was made accessible to the public, and links were generated and posted to 
Facebook religious group pages in order to target the necessary participants (e.g., 
Mormon, Scientologist, atheist, Christian) as well as research participant sites such as 
Call for Participants and The Inquisitive Mind.  During data collection, the atheist group 
of participants far outpaced other groups, particularly Christians, and as such it became 
necessary to expand data collection to Reddit.  This change in procedure was approved by 
the Walden IRB on July 10, 2018.  The survey was advertised in both religious and 
political Reddit threads.  The survey was concluded on September 24, 2018.  Participants 
were required to be of legal voting age in the US (18) and residents of the US. 
Participants were asked twice if they wished to continue with the survey, once 
after reading the informed consent page, before beginning the survey, and once again 
before submitting their responses and following a debriefing page.  For any participant 
selecting the “no” box, they were rerouted to the end of the survey, thanking them for 
their time.  The informed consent page consisted of the purpose of the study, an outline of 
the procedures for the study as well as the voluntary nature of participation, risks and 
benefits, privacy rights, and contact information.  Participants were also informed that 
those who agreed to enter the survey were indicating their consent to participate, however 
they were free to stop at any time, and were once again allowed to not submit their 
88 
 
responses at the conclusion of the survey.  No personally identifying information was 
collected, as it was not necessary for the nature of the study, further protecting 
participants. 
Recruitment, Change in Procedure, and Response Rates 
 Once the survey went live on Survey Monkey, advertisements to participants were 
posted on Facebook pages targeting specific religious groups, with the expectation that 
each religious group was represented within the study.  Given the nature of social media 
and that individual followers of a group page may have also chosen to share the survey 
on their own pages or other pages, it is unknown if the survey was posted in other 
locations.  The survey was also shared on research-oriented sites such as Call for 
Participants and The Inquisitive Mind, however very few participants were generated 
through these pages.  Survey Monkey provides separate collector links to track participant 
totals from each collection type, and only 12 participants were counted between these two 
pages.  Facebook posts resulted in 616 participants. 
 The first week after the survey went live, participation was very high but then 
began to wane.  Most notably, while the atheist, agnostic, and nonreligious participants 
already exceeded the necessary sample size, the survey was not attracting many Christian 
participants.  Because of this, a procedural change was submitted to the IRB in order to 
expand data collection.  The request sought to advertise the survey using Reddit, and was 
approved in July, 2018.  Reddit was then added as a collector, which resulted in 339 more 
participants across all religious categories. 
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The response rate for the survey was 89%, with 967 total participants and 862 
completed surveys; the incomplete cases were removed from the data.  Any participants 
that chose not to submit their responses either at the beginning or end of the survey would 
not have been calculated in the totals.  Of the 862 participants, 88 participants belong to 
Jewish (3), Muslim (1), Hindu (1), Buddhist (4), Native American (1), Wiccan (3), 
Catholic (68), and Pagan (7) faiths, respectively, while 195 participants claimed to be 
agnostic (76) or nonreligious (119).  This leaves 579 participants identifying as Protestant 
(64), Mormon (73), Scientologist, and atheist (373).  The hypotheses for this study 
focused only on Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist participants and political 
candidates of the same identities; therefore, only participants identifying as Protestant, 
Mormon, Scientologist, or atheist were analyzed for the purposes of this study.  The a 
priori analysis for an ANOVA with fixed effects, special-main effects, and interactions 
that was calculated using G*Power suggested the study would require a sample size of 
256 total participants (N = 256) to produce a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .5), with a 
power level of .80 and an alpha level of .05 (Cohen, 1969).  As such, the participant total 
far exceeds this goal.  However, it is important to note the sample contains more atheist 
participants than Mormon, Scientologist, and Protestant participants. 
Descriptive Statistics and Demographic Characteristics 
Table 1 displays the demographic data collected, (i.e., age, gender, education 
level, race, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, religious identity). The largest 
percentage of participants were 30-39 (N = 189, 32.6%) and more females than males 
completed the survey (N = 329, 56.8%).  The largest demographic disparity was found in 
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race/ethnicity with 78.9% of participants identifying as White (N = 457).  Education was 
distributed across each choice, with the largest number of participants having completed 
a 4-year college degree (N = 178, 30.7%).  Nearly half of the participants identified as 
Democratic (N = 289, 49.9%), and the most frequently reported household income was 
between $25,000 and $49,000 (N = 111, 19.2%).  Religious identity was fairly evenly 
distributed across all groups except atheists which represented 44.3% of participants (N = 
373). 
Table 1 
Frequencies: Age, Gender, Race/Ethnicity, Education, Political Affiliation, and Income 
Variable                n         %   
Age       
  18-20                                                                             22 3.8   
  21-29 117 20.2   
  30-39 189 32.6   
  40-49 108 18.7   
  50-59 93 16.1   
  60 + 50 8.6   
Gender     
  Female 329 56.8   
  Male 250 43.2   
Race/Ethnicity     
  American Indian 5 .9   
  Asian 13 2.2   
  Black 10 1.7   
  Hispanic 21 3.6   
  White 457 78.9   
  Mixed 73 12.6   
Education     
  Some High School 18 3.1   
  High School 48 8.3   
  Some College 144 24.9   
  2 Year Degree 66 11.4   
  4 Year Degree 178 30.7   
  Graduate Degree 125 21.6   
Political Affiliation     
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  Democratic 289 49.9   
  Republican 81 14.0   
  Independent 43 7.4   
  Green 4 .7   
  Constitution 1 .2   
  Libertarian 28 4.8   
  Other 13 2.2   
  None 120 20.7   
Income Level     
  $0-$9,999 11  1.9   
  $10,000 to $24,999 36 6.2   
  $25,000 to $49,999 111 19.2   
  $50,000 to $74,999 108 18.7   
  $75,000 to $99,999 96 16.6   
  $100,000 to $124,999 66 11.4   
  $125,000 to $149,999 42 7.3   
  $150,000 to $174,999 27 4.7   
  $175,000 to $199,999 20 3.5   
  $200,000 and up 36 6.2   
  Prefer not to answer 26  4.5   
Religious Identity     
  Protestant 64 7.6   
  Mormon 73 8.7   
  Scientology 69 8.2   
  Atheist 373 44.3   
 
The convenience non-probability sampling method used to recruit participants 
means that the sample may not be truly representative of US voters belonging to each 
religious identity and as such cannot be generalized to all voters of each religious 
category.  This limitation may result in low external validity.  However, while the use of 
the Internet may unintentionally eliminate low-income participants, it should provide an 





The sample consisted of 579 US residents of legal voting age.  Table 2 displays 
the means and standard deviations for participant religious identity compared to the 
candidate type evaluated in the survey.   
Table 2 
 














  Protestant Protestant 5.625 1.857 16 
 Mormon 3.125 2.029 16 
 Scientologist 2.625 1.500 16 
 Atheist 3.250 1.732 16 
 Total 3.656 2.102 64 
  Mormon Protestant 5.813 1.106 16 
 Mormon 6.053 1.747 19 
 Scientologist 4.000 1.700 19 
 Atheist 4.105 1.595 19 
 Total 4.959 1.813 73 
Scientologist Protestant 5.389 1.577 18 
 Mormon 4.438 1.460 16 
 Scientologist 5.471 1.972 17 
 Atheist 5.500 1.855 18 
 Total 5.217 1.748 69 
Atheist Protestant 5.193 1.353 93 
 Mormon 4.052 1.788 97 
 Scientologist 3.222 1.860 99 
 Atheist 6.833 1.769 84 
 Total 4.743 2.160 373 
Total Protestant 5.336 1.424 143 
 Mormon 4.250 1.920 148 
 Scientologist 3.501 1.963 151 
 Atheist 5.861 2.200 137 




Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions 
The assumptions of the factorial ANOVA include the necessity of the dependent 
variables to be measured at the interval or ratio level.  As all dependent variables are 
measured on a numbered scale (e.g., voter likelihood scale) or a semantic differential 
scale (e.g., 7 points of intensity), the dependent variables are interval (i.e., there is a 
measurable distance between each value of the dependent variables), fulfilling this 
assumption.  The second assumption of “goodness of fit” and the third assumption of 
homoscedasticity is not met in this data set.  Kolmogorov-Simonov test as well as 
Levene’s test does not show the data to be evenly distributed.  However, some 
statisticians suggest that normality testing is problematic because (1) in large samples 
they can be significant even for small and unimportant effects and (2) in small samples 
they will lack power to detect violations of assumptions (Ruxton, Wilkinson, & 
Neuhäuser, 2015).  With this in mind, the data will be interpreted with caution and further 
analyses of the demographic data will be conducted to ensure random assignment 
occurred.   
The fourth assumption is that no multicollinearity occurs.  Multicollinearity 
occurs when the independent variables are intercorrelated, thus not being independent 
from each other.  As the independent variables are participant and candidate religious 
affiliation, this assumption has been met.  A participant’s religious identity is not 
dependent upon the candidate’s religious identity and one does not imply the other.  They 
may interact with one another, but these variables are not correlated and are two distinct 
independent variables.  The independent variables are nominal and religious identities are 
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coded 1-4 for participants (1 for Protestant, 2 for Mormon, 3 for Scientology, 4 for 
atheist) and 1-4 for candidates (1 for Protestant, 2 for Mormon, 3 for Scientologist, 4 for 
atheist).   
Factorial ANOVA Analyses 
The four research questions in the study were tested using four separate 4 X 4 
factorial ANOVA analyses, one for each of the dependent variables.  An initial series of 
four separate 4 X 4 factorial analyses (participant religious identity by candidate type) 
were conducted to evaluate the hypotheses.  Voting intention and the three semantic 
scales were the dependent variables.  Each analysis was a 4 (participant religious identity: 
Protestant [N = 64], Mormon [N = 73], Scientologist [N = 69], atheist [N = 373]) X 4 
(candidate type: Protestant [N = 204], Mormon [N = 206], Scientologist [N = 215], and 
atheist [N = 373]) factorial ANOVA with one of the four dependent variables and with 
alpha set at .05. 
In each of the four 4 X 4 factorial ANOVAs, significant interactions were found, 
necessitating a closer look at the independent variables through simple effect analyses.  
The Bonferroni post hoc correction was selected for follow up to minimize Type I errors 
given the large number of comparisons that were made.  This is because the probability 
of a false-positive result is more likely with multiple pairwise tests, increasing with each 
hypothesis tested; the Bonferroni correction will reduce the odds of this occurring, 
although it may reduce the overall power of the statistical findings. 
Research Questions 1 and 2.  Research questions one and two were both 
answered with a 4 X 4 factorial ANOVA with voting intention as the dependent variable.   
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Research Question 1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking 
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-
mainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014), was answered using the main effect 
analyses of the ANOVA. 
Research Question 2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based 
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the 
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014) was answered using the interaction 
effect analyses of the ANOVA.  The complete ANOVA results are presented in Table 3, 
and a profile plot of candidate type group means x participant religious identity group 
with the dependent variable of voting intention appears in Figure 1. 
Table 3 















Religion 96.754 3 32.251 11.123 <.001 .056 
Candidate 130.741 3 43.580 15.030 <.001 .074 
Religion x 
Candidate 
339.027 9 37.670 12.992 <.001 .172 
Error 1632.411 563 2.899    




Figure 1.  Voting Likelihood Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type  
 
The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and 
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 11.123, p < .001,  = .056), indicating a 
significant difference between Protestant (M = 3.656, SE = .213) Mormon (M = 4.993, SE 
= .200) Scientologist (M = 5.199, SE = .205) and atheist (M = 4.825, SE = .088) religious 
identities and participant voting intention.  Means plots for religious identity main effect 
by voting intention are presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Means Plots for Voting Likelihood and Religious Identity  
 
 
The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a medium effect 
size (F(3, 563) = 15.030, p < .001,  = .074), indicating a significant difference between 
Protestant (M = 5.505, SE = .186) Mormon (M = 4.417, SE = .185) Scientologist (M = 
3.829, SE = .183) and atheist (M = 4.922, SE = .182) candidate types and participant 
voting intention.  Means plots for candidate type main effect by voting intention are 
presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Means Plots for Voting Likelihood and Candidate Type  
 
The analysis also showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for voting 
intention (F(9, 563) = 12.992, p < .001), which represents a large effect size (  = .172).  
An analysis of simple effects showed that there was no statistically significant difference 
across participant groups voting for the Protestant candidate.  When participants were 
presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group 
comparisons except for Scientologist participants when compared to atheist participants.  
When participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant 
difference was noted for all group comparisons except for Protestant compared to atheist 
and Mormon compared to atheist participants.  When participants were presented with 
the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group comparisons except 
for Protestant compared to Mormon participants.  A complete table of comparisons can 






Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Voting Likelihood 
      
95% CI 
Candidate Comparisons Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 




Protestant Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.188 .602 .756 -1.370 .995 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.236 .585 .687     -.913 1.385 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
.431 .461 .350 -.474 1.337 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.424 .585 .469 -.726 1.573 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.619 .461 .180 -.289 1.524 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.195 .438 .656 -.666 1.057 
Mormon Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-2.928* .578 <.001 -4.062 -1.793 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.313* .602 .030 -2.495 -.130 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.927* .459 .044 -1.829 -.024 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
1.615* .578 .005 .480 2.750 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
2.001* .427 <.001 1.162 2.840 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.386 .459 .401 -.517 1.288 
Scientologist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-1.375* .578 .018 -2.510 -.240 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-2.846* .593 <.001 -4.011 -1.681 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.597 .459 .194 -1.498 .304 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.471* .568 .010 -2.587 -.354 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.778 .426 .069 -.060 1.615 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
2.248* .447 <.001 1.370 3.126 
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Atheist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.855 .578 .139 -1.990 .280 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-2.250* .585 <.001 -3.399 -1.101 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-3.583* .464 <.001 -4.496 -2.671 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.395* .560 .013 -2.495 -.295 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
-2.728* .433 <.001 -3.578 -1.878 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
-1.333* .442 .003 -2.202 -4.65 
* p < 0.05 
 
Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that 
religious identity significantly influenced voting intention, depending on the candidate 
type presented.  The post hoc test results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. 
Table 5 
Religious Identity by Voting Likelihood Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
      
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






-1.3027* .29159 <.001 -2.0747 -.5306 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.5611* .29551 <.001 -2.3435 -.7787 
Protestant vs. Atheist -1.0864* .23039 <.001 -1.6964 -.4764 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.2585 .28590 1.000 -1.0154 .4985 
Mormon vs. Atheist .2163 .21793 1.000 -.3607 .7933 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
.4748 .22315 .203 -.1160 1.0656 






Candidate Type by Voting Likelihood Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
     
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






1.0857* .19967 <.001 .5570 1.6143 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
1.8257* .19869 <.001 1.2997 2.3518 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.5256 .20357 .060 -1.0646 .0133 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.7401* .19696 <.001 .2186 1.2615 
Mormon vs. Atheist -1.6113* .20188 <.001 -2.1458 -1.0768 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
-2.3514* .20091 <.001 -2.8833 -1.8194 
* p < 0.05 
 
Protestant participants expressed a greater intention to vote for Protestant 
candidates (M = 5.625, SE = .426) and the lowest intention to vote for Scientologist 
candidates (M = 2.625, SE = .426) with Mormon (M = 3.125, SE = .426) averaging 
slightly lower than atheist candidates (M = 3.250, SE = .426).  A means plot for 
Protestant participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4.  Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Voting 
Likelihood 
 
Mormon participants expressed the highest intention to vote for Mormon 
candidates (M = 6.053, SE = .391) with Protestant candidates measuring only slightly 
lower than the Mormon candidate (M = 5.812, SE = .426) and the lowest intention for 
Scientologist candidates (M = 4.000, SE = .388) with atheist candidates only slightly 
greater than the Scientologist candidate (M = 4.000, SE = .391).  A means plot for 
Mormon participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 5.   
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Figure 5.  Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Voting 
Likelihood 
 
Scientologist participants expressed a slightly higher intention to vote for atheist 
candidates (M = 5.500, SE = .401) than Scientologist candidates (M = 5.471, SE = .413) 
with Protestant candidates slightly below (M = 5.389, SE = .401) and the lowest intention 
to vote for Mormon candidates (M = 4.437, SE = 4.26).  A means plot for Scientologist 








Figure 6.  Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Voting 
Likelihood 
 
Atheist participants expressed the greatest intention to vote for atheist candidates 
(M = 6.833, SE = .186) followed by the Protestant candidates (M = 5.194, SE = .177) a 
lower intention to vote for Mormon candidates (M = 4.052, SE = .173) and the lowest 
intention to vote for Scientologist candidates (M = 3.222, SE = .171).  A means plot for 








Figure 7.  Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Voting Likelihood 
  
This analysis demonstrated a significant difference for participant voting intention 
based on candidate-type as measured by the voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 
2014).  However, the main effect results for candidate type indicated that the 
Scientologist and Mormon candidates performed more poorly than the atheist candidate.   
As a result of the participant group size disparity, there was concern that the 
atheist candidate may present more favorably than the candidate would have if the atheist 
participant group were not disproportionately larger than the other participant groups.  
However, when an analysis was conducted excluding the atheist participants, the 
Scientologist (M = 4.032, SE = .236) and Mormon (M = 4.538, SE = .238) candidates 
were still viewed more negatively than the atheist candidate (M = 4.285, SE = .234) by all 
groups but their own.  Therefore, for research question one, the null hypothesis (Ho1) 
was not rejected, as atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political 
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office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream 
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist). 
For research question two, all of the participant groups demonstrated the highest 
likelihood to vote for their own candidate type, except Scientologists who favored the 
atheist candidate slightly more than the Scientologist candidate.  Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis (Ha2) for research question 2 is accepted; participants are more 
likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological similarity.  
Research Question 3.  Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, and as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?  This research question was 
answered with a 4 X 4 factorial ANOVA with distrust as the dependent variable.  The 
complete ANOVA results are presented in Table 7, and a profile plot of candidate type 
group means by participant religious identity group with the dependent variable of 
distrust appears in Figure 8.  It is important to note that high scores indicate the 
participant is more likely to trust this candidate while low scores indicate that the 




















Religion 41.075 3 13.692 9.077 <.001 .046 
Candidate 41.531 3 13.844 9.177 <.001 .047 
Religion x 
Candidate 
217.558 9 24.173 16.025 <.001 .204 
Error 849.253 563 1.508    
Total 10820.000 579     
 
Figure 8. Trust Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type 
 
The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and 
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.077, p < .001,  = .046), indicating a 
difference between Protestant (M = 3.578, SE = .154) Mormon (M = 4.442, SE = .144) 
Scientologist (M = 4.546, SE = .148) and atheist (M = 4.037, SE = .064) religious 
identities and participant distrust.  Means plots for religious identity effect by distrust are 
presented in Figure 9. 
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The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect 
size (F(3, 563) = 9.177, p < .001,  = .047), indicating a difference between Protestant 
(M = 4.649, SE = .134) Mormon (M = 4.250, SE = .133) Scientologist (M = 3.693, SE = 
.132) and atheist (M = 4.012, SE = .131) candidate types and participant distrust.  Means 










Figure 10. Means Plots for Distrust and Candidate Type 
 
 
The analysis also showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for trust 
(F(9, 563) = 16.025, p < .001) which represents a large effect size (  = .204).  An 
analysis of simple effects showed a statistically significant difference in distrust/trust 
scores for Protestant participants compared to atheist participants when presented with 
the Protestant candidate.  A moderately significant result was also noted for Mormon 
participants compared to atheist participants when presented with the Protestant 
candidate.  When participants were presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant 
difference was noted for Protestant compared to Mormon participants, Mormon 
compared to Scientologist participants, and Mormon compared to atheist participants.  
When participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant 
difference was noted for all comparison groups except Protestant compared to atheist 
participants.  When participants were presented with the atheist candidate, a significant 
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difference was noted across all group comparisons except Protestant compared to 
Mormon participants.  A complete table of comparisons can be found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Trust 
      
95% CI 
Candidate Comparisons Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 




Protestant Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
.188 .434 .666 -.665 1.040 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.618 .422 .144     -.211 1.447 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
.847* .332 .011 .195 1.500 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.431 .422 .308 -.398 1.259 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.660* .332 .048 .007 1.313 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.229 .316 .469 -.392 .851 
Mormon Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-2.007* .417 <.001 -2.825 -1.188 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-.375 .434 .388 -1.228 .478 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.117 .331 .724 -.768 .534 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
1.632* .417 <.001 .813 2.450 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
1.889* .308 <.001 1.284 2.495 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.258 .331 .437 -.393 .909 
Scientologist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.987* .417 .018 -1.805 -.168 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-2.544* .428 <.001 -3.384 -1.704 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.240 .331 .469 -.890 .410 
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 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.557* .410 <.001 -2.363 -.752 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.747* .308 .015 .143 1.351 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
2.304* .322 <.001 1.671 2.938 
Atheist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.651 .417 .119 -1.470 .167 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.569* .422 <.001 -2.398 -.741 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-2.327* .335 <.001 -2.985 -1.669 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.918* .404 .023 -1.712 -.125 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
-1.676* .312 <.001 -2.289 -1.063 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
-.758* .319 .018 -1.385 -.131 
* p < 0.05 
   
Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that 
religious identity significantly influenced distrust, depending on the candidate type 




Religious Identity by Trust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
      
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






-.8465* .21032 <.001 -1.4032 -.2897 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-.9726* .21315 <.001 -1.5369 -.4083 
 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.4112* .16617 .082 -.8511 -.0288 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.1261 .20622 1.000 -.6720 .4199 
Mormon vs. Atheist .4354 .15719 .035 .0192 .8516 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
.5614* .16095 .003 .1353 .9876 
* p < 0.05 
 
Table 10 
Candidate Type by Trust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
     
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






.4126 .14402 .026 .0313 .7939 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
1.0947* .14331 <.001 .7153 1.4741 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.1860 .14683 1.000 -.5747 .2028 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.6821* .14206 <.001 .3060 1.0582 
Mormon vs. Atheist -.5985* .14561 <.001 -.9841 -.2130 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
-1.2807* .14491 <.001 -1.6643 -.8970 




Protestant participants expressed more trust for the Protestant candidate (M = 
5.062, SE = .307) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 3.625, SE = .307) the atheist 
candidate (M = 2.875, SE = .307) and the lowest levels of trust for the Scientologist 
candidate (M = 2.750, SE = .307).  A means plot for Protestant participant by candidate 
type for distrust can be found in Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11.  Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust 
 
Mormon participants trust the Mormon candidate the most (M = 5.632, SE = .282) 
followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.875, SE = .307) the Scientologist candidate 
(M = 3.737, SE = .282) and with the lowest levels of trust for the atheist candidate (M = 
3.526, SE = .282).  A means plot for Mormon participant by candidate type for distrust 




Figure 12.  Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust 
 
Scientologist participants trust the Scientologist candidate the most (M = 5.294, 
SE = .298) followed by the atheist candidate (M = 4.444, SE = .289), then the Protestant 
candidate (M = 4.444, SE = .289) with the lowest levels of trust for the Mormon 
candidate (M = 4.000, SE = .307).  A means plot for Scientologist participant by 










Figure 13.  Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust 
 
Atheist participants trusted the atheist candidate the most (M = 5.202, SE = .134) 
with the Protestant candidate coming next (M = 4.215, SE = .127) followed by the 
Mormon candidate (M = 3.742, SE = .125) with the lowest levels of trust for the 
Scientologist candidate (M = 2.990, SE = .123).  A means plot for atheist participant by 
candidate type for distrust can be found in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust 
 
 This analysis demonstrated that all participants viewed the ideologically similar 
candidate the most trustworthy, therefore the alternative hypothesis (Ha3) for research 
question 3 is accepted: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014). 
Research Question 4.  Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory 
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?  This research question was answered with a 4 X 4 factorial 
ANOVA with disgust as the dependent variable.  The complete ANOVA results are 
presented in Table 11, and a profile plot of candidate type group means by participant 




















Religion 35.947 3 11.982 9.342 <.001 .047 
Candidate 29.637 3 9.879 7.702 <.001 .039 
Religion x 
Candidate 
187.041 9 20.782 16.203 <.001 .206 
Error 722.105 563 1.283    
Total 12552.000 579     
 
 
Figure 15.  Disgust Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type 
 
 
The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and 
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.342, p < .001,  = .047), indicating a 
difference between Protestants (M = 3.828, SE = .142), Mormons (M = 4.595, SE = .133) 
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Scientologists (M = 4.806, SE = .137) and atheists (M = 4.516, SE = .059).  Means plots 
for religious identity main effect by disgust are presented in Figure 16.   
 
Figure 16. Means Plots for Disgust and Religious Identity 
 
 
The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect 
size (F(3, 814) = 12.617, p < .001,  = .044), indicating a difference between Protestant 
(M = 4.833, SE = .124) Mormon (M = 4.396, SE = .123) Scientologist (M = 4.008, SE = 
.121) and atheist (M = 4.508, SE = .121) candidate types.  Means plots for candidate type 







Figure 17. Means Plots for Disgust and Candidate Type 
 
The analysis showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for disgust (F(9, 
563) = 16.203, p <.001), which represents a large effect size (  = .206).  An analysis of 
simple effects showed that when participants were presented with a Protestant candidate, 
a statistically significant difference in disgust scores was observed for Mormon compared 
to atheist participants.  No statistically significant difference in disgust scores was found 
across all other participant group comparisons for the Protestant candidate.  When 
participants were presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant difference was 
noted for Protestant compared to Mormon participants, Mormon compared to 
Scientologist participants, and Mormon compared to atheist participants.  When 
participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant difference was 
noted for all participant group comparisons except for Protestant compared to atheist 
participants and Mormon compared to atheist participants.  When participants were 
presented with the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group 
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comparisons except Protestant compared to Mormon participants.  A complete table of 
comparisons can be found in Table 12.      
 
Table 12 
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Disgust 
      
95% CI 
Candidate Comparisons Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 




Protestant Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
.188 .400 .640 -.599 .974 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.694 .389 .075     -.070 1.459 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
.788* .307 .010 .186 1.390 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.507 .389 .193 -.257 1.271 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.600 .307 .051 -.002 1.202 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.093 .292 .749 -.480 .666 
Mormon Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-1.451* .384 <.001 -2.205 -.696 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-.625 .400 .119 -1.411 .161 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.260 .306 .396 -.860 .341 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.826* .384 .032 .071 1.580 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
1.191* .284 <.001 .633 1.749 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.365 .306 .232 -.235 .966 
Scientologist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-1.095* .384 .005 -1.850 -.341 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-2.114* .394 <.001 -2.889 -1.339 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.574 .305 .061 -1.173 .026 
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 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.019* .378 .007 -1.761 -.276 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.522 .284 .067 -.036 1.079 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
1.540* .297 <.001 .956 2.124 
Atheist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.707 .384 .066 -1.462 .048 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.868* .389 <.001 -2.632 -1.104 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-2.705* .309 <.001 -3.312 -2.099 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.161* .373 .002 -1.892 -.429 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
-1.998* .288 <.001 -2.563 -1.433 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
-.837* .294 .005 -1.415 -.260 
* p < 0.05 
 
Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that 
religious identity significantly influenced disgust, depending on the candidate type 




Religious Identity by Disgust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
      
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-
J)  






-.7472* .19393 <.001 -1.2607 -.2338 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-.9835* .19654 <.001 -1.5038 -.4631 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.6357* .15323 <.001 .2338 1.2607 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.2363 .19015 1.000 -.7397 .2672 
Mormon vs. Atheist .1115 .14494 1.000 -.2722 .4953 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
.3478 .14842 .117 -.0452 .7407 
* p < 0.05 
 
Table 14 
Candidate Type by Disgust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
     
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






.3929* .13280 <.001 .0413 .7445 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.8148* .13215 <.001 .4649 1.1647 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.5604* .13539 <.001 -.9189 -.2019 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.4219* .13100 .008 .0751 .7687 
Mormon vs. Atheist -.9533* .13427 <.001 -1.3088 -.5978 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
-1.3752* .13363 <.001 -1.7290 -1.0214 




Protestant participants were the most disgusted by the Scientologist candidate (M 
= 3.063, SE = .283) with the atheist candidate faring only slightly better (M = 3.188, SE = 
.283); the Mormon candidate was not viewed as appealing but more so than the previous 
two candidates (M = 3.812, SE = .283), and the Protestant candidate was viewed as the 
most appealing candidate by Protestant participants (M = 5.250, SE = .283).  A means 
plot for Protestant participant by candidate type for disgust can be found in Figure 18.   
 
Figure 18.  Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust 
 
 
Mormon participants viewed the atheist candidate with the most disgust (M = 
3.895, SE = .260) with the Scientologist candidate scoring as less disgusting but still 
highly unappealing (M = 4.158, SE = .260), while the Protestant candidate was viewed as 
slightly appealing (M = 5.063, SE = .283) and the Mormon candidate was viewed as 
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highly appealing (M = 5.263, SE = .260).  A means plot for Mormon participant by 
candidate type for disgust can be found in Figure 19.   
 
Figure 19.  Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust 
 
Scientologist participants rated the Mormon candidate as the least appealing (M = 
4.438, SE = .283) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.556, SE = .267), the atheist 
candidate (M = 5.056, SE = .267), and the Scientologist candidate as the most appealing 
(M = 5.176, SE = .275).  A means plot for Scientologist participant by candidate type for 








Figure 20.  Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust 
 
 
Atheist participants viewed the atheist candidate as highly appealing (M = 5.893, 
SE = .124) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.462, SE = .117) the Mormon 
candidate (M = 4.072, SE = .115), and the Scientologist candidate was rated as highly 
disgusting to atheist participants (M = 3.636, SE = .114).  A means plot for atheist 









Figure 21.  Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust 
 
This analysis demonstrated a significant difference in participant disgust levels 
based on participant religious identity and candidate type as measured by the 7-point 
semantic differential scale for disgust (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis (Ha4) for research question 4, i.e., participants will be more likely to rate a 
candidate with lower levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by 
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, is accepted.   
Research Question 5.  Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and 
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?  This research question was answered with a 4 X 4 factorial 
ANOVA with fear as the dependent variable.  The complete ANOVA results are 
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presented in Table 15, and a profile plot of candidate type group means by participant 



















Religion 41.063 3 13.688 9.607 <.001 .049 
Candidate 25.315 3 8.438 5.923 .001 .031 
Religion x 
Candidate 
175.880 9 19.542 13.717 <.001 .180 
Error 802.097 563 1.386    
Total 11379.000 579     
 
Figure 22.  Fear Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type 
 
 
The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and 
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.607, p < .001,  = .049), indicating a 
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difference between Protestants (M = 3.656, SE = .149) Mormons (M = 4.524, SE = .140) 
Scientologists (M = 4.672, SE = .144) and atheists (M = 4.201, SE = .062).  Means plots 
for religious identity main effect by fear are presented in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23. Means Plots for Fear and Religious Identity 
 
 
The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect 
size (F(3, 563) = 5.923, p = .001,  = .031), indicating a difference between Protestant 
(M = 4.635, SE = .131) Mormon (M = 4.270, SE = .129) Scientologist (M = 3.866, SE = 
.128) and atheist (M = 4.282, SE = .128) candidate types.   Mean plots for candidate type 





Figure 24. Means Plots for Fear and Candidate Type 
 
 
The analysis showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for disgust (F(9, 
563) = 13.717, p <.001), which represents a large effect size (  = .180).  An analysis of 
simple effects showed that when participants were presented with a Protestant candidate, 
a statistically significant difference in fear scores was observed for Protestant compared 
to atheist participants and Mormon compared to atheist participants.  No statistically 
significant difference in fear scores was found across all other participant group 
comparisons for the Protestant candidate.  When participants were presented with the 
Mormon candidate, a significant difference was noted for Protestant compared to atheist 
participants and Mormon compared to Scientologist participants.  When participants were 
presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all 
group comparisons, except Protestant compared to atheist participants.  When 
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participants were presented with the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted 
for Protestant compared to Mormon participants and Mormon compared to Scientologist 
participants.  A complete table of comparisons can be found in Table 16.      
 
Table 16 
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Fear 
      
95% CI 
Candidate Comparisons Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 




Protestant Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
.063 .422 .882 -.766 .891 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.667 .410 .105     -.139 1.472 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
.731* .323 .024 .097 1.366 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.604 .410 .141 -.201 1.410 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.669* .323 .039 -.034 1.303 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.065 .307 .834 -.539 .668 
Mormon Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-1.826* .405 <.001 -2.621 -.696 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.188* .422 .005 -2.016 -.359 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.315 .322 .328 -.948 .318 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.638 .405 .116 -.157 1.434 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
1.511* .299 <.001 .922 2.099 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
.872* .322 .007 .240 1.505 
Scientologist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-1.053* .405 .010 -1.848 -.257 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-2.118* .416 <.001 -2.934 -1.301 
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 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-.293 .322 .363 -.925 .339 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.065* .398 .008 -1.848 -.282 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
.760* .299 .011 .172 1.347 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
1.825* .313 <.001 1.209 2.440 
Atheist Protestant vs. 
Mormon 
-.655 .405 .107 -1.450 .141 
 Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.424* .410 .001 -2.229 -.618 
 Protestant vs. 
Atheist 
-2.301* .326 <.001 -2.940 -1.661 
 Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.769 .393 .051 -1.540 .002 
 Mormon vs. 
Atheist 
-1.646* .303 <.001 -2.242 -1.050 
 Scientologist 
vs. Atheist 
-.877* .310 .005 -1.486 -.268 
* p < 0.05 
 
Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that 
religious identity significantly influenced fear of a candidate, depending on the candidate 




Religious Identity by Fear Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
      
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  






-.8506* .20439 <.001 -1.3918 -.3094 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
-1.0104* .20714 <.001 -1.5589 -.4620 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.4939* .16149 .014 -.9215 -.0663 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
-.1598 .20041 1.000 -.6904 .3708 
Mormon vs. Atheist .3567 .15276 .119 -.0477 .7612 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
.5165* .15642 .006 .1024 .9307 




Candidate Type by Fear Bonferroni Post Hoc Test 
     
95% CI 
Comparisons  Mean 
Difference (I-J)  




Protestant vs. Mormon .4268* .13996 .014 .0562 .7974 
Protestant vs. 
Scientologist 
.8707* .13928 <.001 .5019 1.2394 
Protestant vs. Atheist -.4423* .14270 .012 -.8201 -.0645 
Mormon vs. 
Scientologist 
.4438* .13806 .008 .0783 .8094 
Mormon vs. Atheist -.8692* .14151 <.001 -1.2438 -.4945 
Scientologist vs. 
Atheist 
-1.3130* .14083 <.001 -1.6859 -.9401 




Protestant participants viewed the Scientologist candidate as the most threatening 
(M = 3.000, SE = .298) with the atheist candidate slightly less threatening (M = 3.188, SE 
= .298) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 3.438, SE = .298), scoring the Protestant 
candidate as more comforting (M = 5.000, SE = .298).  A means plot for Protestant 
participant by candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 25.   
 
 
Figure 25.  Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Fear 
 
 
Mormon participants viewed the atheist candidate as the most threatening (M = 
3.842, SE = .274) followed by the Scientologist candidate (M = 4.053, SE = .274) then 
the Protestant candidate (M = 4.938, SE = .298) and the Mormon candidate viewed as the 
most comforting (M = 5.263, SE = .274).  A means plot for Mormon participant by 
candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26.  Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Fear 
 
 
    Scientologist participants scored the Protestant candidate as the most threatening 
of the four (M = 4.333, SE = .281) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 4.625, SE = 
.298) then the atheist candidate (M = 4.611, SE = .281) and the Scientologist candidate 
scoring as the most comforting option (M = 5.118, SE = .289).  A means plot for 










Figure 27.  Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Fear 
 
 
   Atheist participants scored the atheist candidate as the most comforting (M = 
5.488, SE = .130) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.269, SE = .124) then the 
Mormon candidate (M = 3.753, SE = .121) with the Scientologist candidate being scored 
as the most threatening (M = 3.293, SE = .120). A means plot for atheist participant by 










Figure 28.  Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Fear 
 
 
This analysis demonstrated a significant difference in participant fear levels based 
on participant religious identity and candidate type as measured by the 7-point semantic 
differential scale for fear (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  Therefore, the alternative hypothesis 
(Ha5) for research question 5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower 
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and 
the socio-functional approach, and as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales 
(Franks & Scherr, 2014) is accepted. 
Summary 
Four separate 4 X 4 factorial ANOVAs were conducted to determine if atheists 
faced greater levels of discrimination when seeking public office than candidates with 
other religious affiliations; the emotional underpinnings of the potential discrimination 
was also examined.  The independent variables in each analysis showed a significant 
interaction effect, demonstrating that while atheists are viewed less favorably by 
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mainstream religious groups, Scientologists are in some cases viewed just as poorly or 
worse.  Consistent with social identity theory, groups typically showed more preference 
and more positive emotional ratings for groups who were ideologically similar.  Chapter 
5 will provide an interpretation of the findings, a discussion of the possible implications 
for social change, and recommendations for future research.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The aim of this study was to assess the comparative electability of atheist political 
candidates with candidates from other nontraditional religious backgrounds (i.e., Mormon 
and Scientologist) using multiple factorial ANOVA analyses.  Previous research has 
found that atheists are heavily discriminated against, especially when running for office, 
and that the only candidates that may face worse discrimination when running for office 
are those often labeled as belonging to a cult (Cragun et al., 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson, 
2006).  The results demonstrated that participants were more likely to vote for candidates 
who shared similar religious affiliations and felt stronger negative emotions toward 
candidates the more dissimilar they were to the participant.  While participants did not 
always rate the atheist candidate as the least favorable among candidate options, simple 
effects analysis suggested that candidates of nonmainstream religious affiliations (i.e., 
Mormon and Scientologist) would face greater challenges seeking public office than 
candidates belonging to mainstream religious groups (i.e., Protestant).  This chapter 
interprets these findings, the limitations of the study, future research recommendations, 
and the implications for positive social change. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 The data collected and analyzed for this study not only helped support past 
research but also provided new insight into directions for future research.  Each 
participant was presented with one of four political candidates, selected randomly; all 
four political candidates were identical, differing only in their religious affiliation.  
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Because of the mainstream acceptance of Protestantism, the Protestant candidate was 
expected to be viewed favorably across all groups and served as a control for the study 
(Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).  The atheist candidate was not 
expected to be viewed favorably, as research on atheists has found that the majority of 
people do not view atheists as trustworthy or moral (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; 
Gervais et al., 2011).  The Scientologist candidate was also not expected to be viewed 
favorably as this minority religious group is often referred to pejoratively by outsiders as 
a cult (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm, 2015).  The term cult is 
used pejoratively to demean smaller religious groups whose practices are outside the 
mainstream (Olson, 2006).  Expectations for the Mormon candidate were unclear, as 
despite outgroup labeling of Mormons as a cult, Mormons are still considered a Christian 
denomination, albeit a small, fringe one (Baker & Campbell, 2010; Smith, 2014; Smith, 
2016).       
Previous research has shown that atheists are highly discriminated against, but 
few studies have examined the comparative favorability for political office of other fringe 
religious groups often labeled “cult” (e.g., Scientologists and Mormons (Greig, 2017; 
Harrison, 2015).  This study is informed by social identity theory, which posits that 
groups are an important source of self-esteem and pride, giving individuals a sense of 
belonging; however, this also often creates an “us” versus “them” mentality where 
individuals categorize people based on group membership, in this case, religious 
affiliation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  The result of this 
ingroup/outgroup thinking is that ingroup members stereotype outgroups, exaggerating 
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their differences while ignoring their similarities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986).  As such, the similarity of the participant to the candidate was expected to 
play a role in the scores the candidate received as predicted by social identity theory.  The 
use of religious identities in this study likely primed participants’’ religious group 
identity, making it that participants would identify with and therefore prefer similar 
candidates while exaggerating differences among dissimilar candidates (Ben-Bassat & 
Dahan, 2012; Tajfel, 1970). 
Using a 9-point voting likelihood scale (1=no chance, 9=100% likely), candidates 
were rated by the participant based on their likelihood to vote for the candidate.  Feelings 
of distrust, disgust, and fear evoked by the candidate were measured using a 7-point scale 
for each emotion with 1 reflecting threat, distrust, or disgust and 7 reflecting comfort, 
trust, and appeal felt by the participants.  The voting likelihood score provides a measure 
to determine discrimination toward a specific religious identity, while the emotional 
scores provide additional insight into emotional reactions experienced by participants 
toward the respective candidates.  
Political Discrimination toward Non-Mainstream Candidates 
 Across all participant groups, non-mainstream candidates consistently scored 
lower on voter preference measures when candidates and participants were ideologically 
dissimilar.  Only the Protestant candidate was scored over the point of neutrality across 
all participant groups, while the Scientologist candidate was the lowest scoring candidate 
for all groups except for the Scientologist participants.  All other ideologically dissimilar 
candidates were rated below the point of neutrality across all participant groups.  The 
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preference for candidates similar to themselves was expected and provides support for 
social identity theory.  However, social identity theory fails to account for some of the 
nuance in the data, such as why the Scientologist participants did not prefer their own 
candidate to the atheist candidate.  System justification theory, which posits that 
individuals are likely to have negative views toward their own groups to maintain the 
status quo (i.e., maintain equilibrium), may provide one explanation, but that does not 
account for why the Scientologist participants preferred the atheist candidate to the 
mainstream Protestant candidate (Jost, 2011). 
 In a political setting, where groups whose values differ are competing for 
dominance (i.e., political power to set the national norms), it is expected to find ingroup 
favoritism, and as such, groups outside of the mainstream will struggle to achieve 
political success (Dunkel & Dutton, 2016; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Johnson, 
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012). With this in mind, social dominance theory (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999) complements social identity theory and helps explain the phenomenon of 
ingroup power structures.  This theory posits that inequalities between groups are 
maintained through institutional discrimination to maintain a social hierarchy, protecting 
the power of those who already have it (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Future studies may 
want to examine how these theories may further explain political discrimination across 
religious identities in the political arena.  
Ideological Similarity, Voter Preference, and Emotional Measures 
 Participant groups typically favored their own ideologically similar candidate, 
with the Scientologist participants being the exception.  The emotional measures (i.e., 
142 
 
trustworthy, fear, and disgust) that accompanied the voter preference scale provided key 
insight into why voters may have chosen to rate the candidate as they did.  For example, 
Protestant participants viewed the Scientologist candidate as the least trustworthy, and 
only the Protestant candidate was rated higher than the point of neutrality on the 
trustworthy scale.  Overall, however, trust measures trended low across most candidates, 
with only the ideologically similar candidate per the participant group scoring over the 
point of neutrality for each candidate group, although the Protestant candidate trended 
higher overall across all groups.  This could suggest overall low trust for nonmainstream 
candidates ideologically dissimilar across participant groups, or it possibly demonstrates 
low trust for political candidates, generally.  Further research is necessary to examine 
which, or if, distrust for nonmainstream candidates and distrust for political candidates in 
general interact to lower trust even further. 
Fear and disgust measures were more varied, with greater peaks and valleys 
across all groups, suggesting that these emotions waxed and waned depending on which 
participant/candidate groups were compared.  Protestant and atheist participants viewed 
the Scientologist candidate as the most disgusting and toward whom they felt the most 
fearful, while the Mormon participants viewed the atheist with the most disgust and fear.  
The Scientologist participants viewed the Mormon candidate as the most disgusting but 
expressed no fear of any of the candidates, as all scored above the point of neutrality.  
However, for the other groups, it appeared that participant disgust and fear were often 
similarly scored for each candidate group, suggesting that these two emotions may be 
highly correlated, while trust appeared to be the strongest predictor of voting preference.  
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The socio-functional approach to prejudice states that specific emotions underlie 
and elicit corresponding prejudicial responses (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  Findings from 
this study supported all socio-functional hypotheses such that participants expressed 
distrust, disgust, and fear for all ideologically dissimilar political candidates based on 
nothing more than religious identity.  However, despite the data collected within this 
study, the emotional measures are still vague in their prejudicial predictions for dissimilar 
candidates, in that emotional responses were all negative, but not necessarily predictive in 
exactly what emotional responses corresponded with each participant to candidate 
pairing.  As such future studies need to place a greater focus on methods of examining 
how these emotions elicit different responses toward political candidates to provide 
further clarity.  One method of doing this could be to use an adjective checklist as a 
follow up measure to the presentation of different religious candidates, to determine 
which emotional words participants are more likely to choose.  However, despite the 
limitations of the scope of this study, the underlying emotional measures were still clearly 
associated with voter preferences toward similar and dissimilar candidates, based on 
religious identity. 
Limitations of the Study 
 This study was limited to English speaking US residents of legal voting age with 
Internet access.  Participants also had to find the study through Reddit or Facebook, 
limiting generalizability.  Demographic data were collected to help ensure the variability 
of the sample; however, there were numerous demographic groups who were under or 
overrepresented.  For example, less than 4% of participants were under 20, less than 9% 
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were over 60, and 78% were white.  The use of a between-groups rather than a within-
groups design also limits the study, because participants rated only one of four candidate 
options, their preferences were not comparative.  
The socio-functional approach to prejudice as well as social identity theory were 
selected as the most appropriate frameworks for this study.  However, other frameworks 
have provided insight into the complexity of anti-atheist sentiment and prejudice, 
meaning the findings here are limited to the explanatory efficacy of the theories that were 
used.  For example, social dominance orientation has been linked to many forms of 
discrimination based on social hierarchies attempting to maintain the status quo (Feather 
& McKee, 2012).  Moreover, the values-conflict hypothesis has been used to explain 
anti-atheist prejudice as atheists are viewed as a threat to the values of mainstream 
religious believers who consider them immoral and view them with disgust (Cook, 
Cottrell, and Webster, 2015). Additionally, this study was conducted utilizing a self-
report survey, meaning that participants’ responses may reflect social desirability bias.  
Social desirability bias occurs when participants respond in ways they believe will be 
viewed favorably rather than risking an honest response that could be viewed negatively 
(Garcia & Gustavson, 1997).  Response bias may also occur when respondents select 
choices based on what they believe the researcher is trying to find (Garcia & Gustavson, 
1997).  Furthermore, participant responses may vary depending on numerous outside 
factors, such as mood at the time the survey was completed.  Survey responses were also 
limited to those individuals who opted to complete the survey, which may differ from 




 The data from this study presents new and exciting insight into not only anti-
atheist prejudice in politics, but also other overlooked religious minority groups and the 
emotions that underlie people’s perceptions of them.  While participants in this study 
were given only a single candidate to rate, future studies could present multiple 
candidates and allow participants to rank order each candidate in terms of preference.  
Rather than narrowly focusing on only three minority and one mainstream religious 
groups, future studies could use the same research method but include other group, e.g., 
Catholics (a mainstream Christian denomination), and Wiccans and other pagan religions 
currently gaining popularly in the US (Pew Research Center, 2014b).  Islam may also be 
of interest given the political tensions involving Muslim immigrants (Ghumman & Ryan, 
2013; Hauslohner, 2017; Khera & Smith, 2017; Taras, 2013).  It may also be worth 
exploring perceptions of groups carrying other nonreligious labels, such as agnostic, to 
determine what, if any, differences exist; for example, research suggests that agnostic is 
perceived as a “softer” label than atheist (Anderson, 2015; Cragun et al., 2012b).  
During the data collection phase, many participants sent emails discussing their 
own views on the research as it was presented.  Many of the atheist participants took 
umbrage with the classification of atheism as a religion.  The demographic question was 
a pre-generated one provided by Survey Monkey; however, many atheists believed 
atheism is the absence of a religion rather than a religion.  Yet, it was still of interest that 
so many atheists felt it important to express their disagreement with this classification.  
Furthermore, the survey presented more than a single nonreligious option (i.e., atheism, 
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agnosticism, no religion) and there were several respondents who identified more closely 
as agnostic or nonreligious than atheist.  Previous research has suggested this is due to the 
stigma surrounding the label of atheism (Cragun et al., 2012a); however, future research 
may want to consider the perceptions associated with each of these labels, what they may 
mean to people, and if each experiences prejudice differently.  Future research may also 
want to examine the ways atheists, in particular, self-identify and the importance of 
distinguishing themselves from a religion, per se. 
Many emails were also received from individuals identifying as Christian who 
took issue with the survey, claiming they felt paranoid about its purpose.  Some of the 
emails expressed concern that the data would allow Russia to gain more information on 
the US while other emails suggested that the scales were unfair because individuals could 
not rate the candidates with the information presented.  This is noteworthy given that all 
the emails from individuals taking issue with some aspect of the survey had been asked to 
rate one of the less traditional candidates (e.g., Scientologist or atheist).  Many of these 
individuals opted not to participate for fear that the study was simply going to make them 
“look bad,” which would only occur if the individual felt negatively toward the candidate 
to begin with.  Future research may want to examine Christian participants’ reluctance to 
participate in a political survey, including their concerns over being perceived poorly for 
having participated.  
Future studies could also examine religious prejudice in politics through other 
religious constructs (e.g., intrinsic or extrinsic orientation) where intrinsic religious 
orientation is belief in living by the letter, i.e., doctrinaire, while extrinsic religious 
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orientation implicates personal motives that lie outside of religion such as social 
acceptance (Allport & Ross, 1967).  Studies have found that each is associated with 
different types of discrimination; exploring this in the context of the current study may 
provide new insight into religious discrimination in politics (Allport & Ross, 1967; 
Herek, 1987).  
Studies have also found that priming analytic thinking increased acceptance of 
secular ideas and reduced prejudice towards atheists (Franks, 2017; Franks & Scherr, 
2017) and that voting location may sway individuals to vote more or less secularly 
(Berger, Meredith, & Weaver, 2008; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; 
Franks & Scherr, 2017; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Mani, 
Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).  For example, voting at a church might prime an 
individual to vote more conservatively, whereas voting at a school is more likely to elicit 
secular votes.  Future studies could use a format similar to this study in a real-world 
polling setting to determine if voting location also plays a role in bias toward candidates 
based on religious identity. 
This study found that Scientologists viewed the atheist candidate more favorably 
than their own candidate.  Research has suggested that even atheists are prejudiced 
against other atheists, owing to negative perceptions that pervade US culture (Gervais et 
al., 2017).  As such, future research may want to examine if the “cult” label has 
permeated US culture to the degree that even Scientologists view other Scientologists 
negatively.  Furthermore, it was found that Protestants reported the most fear toward all 
candidates except their own.  Future studies may want to examine this further, to 
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determine if this trend continues to grow as privileged groups become less privileged and 
diversity among political powerholders continues to grow.  It is worth investigating if 
fear of losing majority status contributes to Protestants’ discrimination toward minority 
groups in the political arena and if this is related to increased diversity in the 
contemporary US (Sandstrom, 2017).   
Implications for Social Change 
 This study not only demonstrated that atheists are viewed poorly compared to a 
more mainstream candidate, but also demonstrated how poorly minority religious groups 
are viewed.  The literature to date, combined with this study implies that groups labeled 
“cult” are viewed poorly.  These findings offer insights into the disparity in political 
representation for these groups.  Just as the Black Lives Matter movement has sparked 
the current national conversation about racial inequality, likewise a conversation about 
proportional political representation for all religious affiliations may be a step toward 
achieving that end.  Research has suggested that exposure minimizes prejudice towards 
atheists (Gervais, 2011; Harms, 2011).  Contact theory suggests that once people are 
exposed to and interact with an otherwise unfamiliar group, their familiarity increases 
and with it an understanding that the similarities are greater than their differences; this 
contact has been found to reduce negative preconceptions that support prejudice (Gervais, 
2011; Harms, 2011).  Moreover, just awareness that the group is more commonplace than 
previously believed, and therefore not so “fringe,” can have a similar impact in reducing 
prejudice toward the group; however this is dependent on other factors as well, such as 




This study aimed to examine the comparative electability of atheist political 
candidates with candidates from traditional and other nontraditional religious 
backgrounds and to examine the emotions that may underlie perceptions of these 
candidates.  Findings demonstrated that while atheists did tend to score more negatively 
(i.e., more fear, distrust, disgust), the Scientologist candidate overall fared the worst in 
nearly all emotional measures as rated by ideologically dissimilar participants.  With 
greater understanding of the issues both atheists and nontraditional candidates face, 
measures can be implemented to alleviate the discrimination these candidates face in an 
attempt to increase equal and diverse representation in political office.  Some examples 
may include removing religious institutions as voting locations, as research suggests bias 
is higher in these locations and impacts how individuals may vote (Berger, Meredith, & 
Wheeler, 2008).  Greater access to voting at home through mail may also alleviate 
location bias to some extent.  Political debates should focus on candidate policy and 
debate rules should avoid a candidate’s religious beliefs as a litmus test for qualification.  
Government offices might stop using religious books to swear elected officials in to 
office and instead use the US constitution or a book of laws so that religious identity is 
not highlighted.  These steps may help alter the way people look at candidates and their 
religious identities and in time reduce prejudiced attitudes; doing so may increase equal 
and diverse representation in political office.   
Lastly, findings from this study suggest that different religious groups elicit 
different emotional reactions contingent on relatedness to that group.  Emotions (e.g., 
150 
 
distrust) can be a knee-jerk reaction that precludes thoughtful consideration of what a 
dissimilar group actually represents.  To that end, greater contact/exposure to dissimilar 
groups would create opportunities to discover and embrace their similarities thereby 
suspending prejudicial perceptions that had once made exposure to each impossible.  As 
long as mainstream religious groups by virtue of their numbers, maintain power in 
Congress, religious bias will likely continue to pervade lawmaking, marginalizing anyone 
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Appendix B: Letter of Permission 
 
 
Andrew S. Franks, PhD 
Assistant Professor of Psychology 
Lake Superior State University 




This letter constitutes my approval for Brittany Bullock-Escobedo to utilize versions of materials 
that I developed in the process of conducting the research detailed in the following source: 
 
Franks, A. S. & Scherr, K. C. (2014). A socio-functional approach to prejudice at the polls: Are 
atheists more politically disadvantaged than Blacks and gays? Journal of Applied Social 












Appendix C: Protestant Candidate Description 
John is a 39-year-old Protestant male running for the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from 
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time 
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda 




Appendix D: Mormon Candidate Description 
John is a 39-year-old Mormon male running for the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from 
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time 
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda 




Appendix E: Scientologist Candidate Description 
John is a 39-year-old Scientologist male running for the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from 
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time 
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda 
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education.   
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Appendix F: Atheist Candidate Description 
John is a 39-year-old atheist male running for the U.S. House of Representatives.  
He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from law school, he 
spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time he enjoys 
outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda prioritizes the 




Appendix G: Disgust Scale 
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Disgust 
 







Appendix H: Distrust Scale 
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Distrust 
 






Appendix I: Fear Scale 
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Fear 
 




Appendix J: Voter Likelihood Scale 
Voter Likelihood Scale 
 
What is the likelihood you would vote for the candidate? 
 





Appendix K: Pilot Study For Semantic Differential Scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014) 
“Items for pilot study to confirm appropriateness of semantic differential scales. Numbers 
in parentheses represent frequencies for each response. 
 
1. How would you rate “appealing” as an antonym for “disgusting”? 
 
A. Not at all acceptable as an antonym for “disgusting.” (0) 
B. Inadequate. Much better choices exist. (0) 
C. Adequate, but not nearly ideal. (1) 
D. It works quite well, but there may be better choices. (18) 
E. Ideal. (1) 
 
2. When a person is described simply as “threatening,” which type of threat are you most 
likely to think that person poses (select only one)? 
 
A. A threat to take money or personal property that is rightfully yours or deny you access 
to money or property that is rightfully yours. (0) 
B. A threat to your physical well-being through direct violence (e.g., assault, battery, or 
an attempt on your life). (18) 
C. A threat of contamination through transmission of disease. (0) 
D. Something else. (2) 
 
*Although there may not be full agreement on the best antonym for disgust—Jon Haidt 
(2003), for example, suggested a concept known as “elevation” as an opposite to moral 
disgust—we felt that lay participants would recognize “appealing” as an antonym to 
“disgusting” within the context of this research.  Further, although “threat” may apply to 
a variety of potential harms within the socio-functional framework, we felt that lay 
participants would consider another person “threatening” because that person could cause 
them violent physical harm. Both of these assumptions were supported by the results of a 
two-item pilot survey distributed to 20 undergraduate research assistants naïve to the 





Appendix L: Informed Consent Form 
You are invited to take part in a research study about your impressions of a political 
candidate based on the amount of information that is presented.  The researcher is 
inviting all United States citizens of legal voting age (18) capable of reading in English to 
the study.  This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to 
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.  
 
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Brittany Escobedo, a doctoral 
student at Walden University. 
 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to determine how much information is necessary for voters 
(participants) to form accurate impressions of political candidates.  Data collected from 




If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:  
• You will be asked to review a description that may vary in length and content on a 
political candidate, and assess your intention to vote for the candidate. 
• You will be asked to assess how the candidate makes you feel and provide three 
short answers on a scale. 
• The survey in total should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation.  If you decide 
to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later. You may answer only the 
questions you feel comfortable answering, and you may stop at any time.  If you do 
participate, completion and return of the survey indicates your consent to the above 
conditions. 
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be 
encountered in daily life, such as stress or becoming upset.  Being in this study would not 
pose risk to your safety or wellbeing.  
 
There are no risks or benefits to you in participating in this survey.  The research benefit 
will allow researchers to understand voter’s political preferences based on how 





Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants. 
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not be 
shared.  Even the researcher will not know who you are.  The researcher will not use your 
personal information for any purpose outside of this research project. Data will be kept 
secure by password protection on the researcher’s computer and on the Survey Monkey 
website.  Data will be kept for a period of at least 5 years, as required by the university.   
 
Contacts and Questions: 
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via email.  If you want to talk privately about your rights as a 
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate.  Walden University’s 
approval number for this study is 03-28-18-0504647 and it expires on March 27, 2019. 
 
Please print or save this consent form for your records.  
 
Obtaining Your Consent 
 
If you feel you understand the study well enough to make a decision about it, please 
indicate your consent by clicking the link below.  
 
Please do not put your name on this form. The survey should take approximately 10 
minutes to complete.  Any questions or concerns should be directed to the principal 
investigator, Brittany Escobedo. 
 
 




Walden University, School of Psychology 
 
By clicking the link below, I confirm that I have read this form and decided that I will 
participate in the project described above. Its general purposes, the particulars of 
involvement, and possible risks and inconveniences have been explained to my 
satisfaction. I understand that I can discontinue participation at any time. My consent also 








Appendix M: Debriefing Form 
Thank you for participating in this study!  We hope you enjoyed the experience.  This 
form provides background about our research to help you learn more about why we are 
doing this study. Please feel free to ask any questions or to comment on any aspect of the 
study. 
 
You have just participated in a research study conducted by Brittany Escobedo. 
 
You were told that the purpose of this study was to determine how much information is 
necessary for voters (participants) to form accurate impressions of political candidates.  
In actuality, we were interested in different reactions from participants to different 
religious affiliations of political candidates, to determine if religious affiliation affects the 
electability of non-Christian candidates.  To protect the integrity of this research, we 
could not fully divulge all the details of this study at the start of the procedure. 
 
As you know, your participation in this study is voluntary. If you so wish, you may 
withdraw after reading this debriefing form, at which point all records of your 
participation will be destroyed. 
 
Again, we thank you for your participation in this study.  I request that you do not discuss 
this project with others until after they have had the opportunity to participate.  Prior 
knowledge of the questions asked during the study can invalidate the results.  I greatly 
appreciate your cooperation.   
 
You may print and keep a copy of this debriefing for your records.  
  
If you have questions now about the research, please ask. If you have questions later, 
please e-mail Brittany Escobedo or if you want to talk privately about your rights as a 
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate.  If, as a result of your 
participation in this study, you experienced any adverse reaction, please contact the 
Walden University IRB. 
 
Thank you again for your participation, 
 
Brittany Escobedo 
Walden University, School of Psychology 
 
